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As technology becomes more advanced so does our capacity to sustain life artificially. We are now able to stay 
alive in situations that would have led to death in the past. This had led to debates on the topic of assisted dying 
both within ethics and law. While some countries have legalized assisted suicide and/or active voluntary euthanasia, 
most European countries have not. Debates over the differences between active and passive euthanasia persist as 
well, and some countries authorize different forms of passive euthanasia despite criminalizing active forms of 
assisted dying.  
 
The first case regarding assisted suicide was brought to the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR or the 
Court) by Mrs. Diane Pretty, who wished to commit suicide by the help of her husband. Assisted suicide is 
criminalized in the United Kingdom, which resulted in Mrs. Pretty complaining to the ECtHR under several articles 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). No violations of any articles were found in the 
case; however, it was the first case where the ECtHR mentioned the possibility of the existence of a right to choose 
how and when to die under article 8 of the Convention.  
 
Since the Pretty case there have been several assisted dying cases brought before the ECtHR and the existence of 
a right to choose how and when to die has been established. This thesis examines the extent an individual can 
choose how and when to die in accordance with the Convention by examining the case-law of the ECtHR and 
writings of scholars, as well as exploring questions that have yet to be addressed by the Court. While the ECtHR 
addresses the extent of the right to choose how and when to die in a rather vague language, with a seeming 
reluctance to address the substantive issues regarding the right, some conclusions can be drawn. The conflict 
between the right to life and the autonomy of the individual has been addressed in many end-of-life cases, 
demonstrating that States are only obliged to prevent suicide in a limited amount of circumstances.  
 
Due to the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the States in end-of-life issues, States are rather free in their 
choice on how to regulate assisted dying. The emphasis on the importance of an autonomous decision and a 
legitimate consent is however emphasised throughout the case-law. Therefore, if States choose to authorize 
different forms of assisted dying, they must ensure that the individual wishing to die has decision-making-capacity 
and has given their legitimate consent to the practice. States that authorize assisted dying must ensure the protection 
of the vulnerable, but whether States can set blanket prohibitions on assisted dying remains debated, as this may be 
discriminatory towards disabled individuals. When it comes to passive euthanasia, the previous wishes of the 
patient are to be crucial in the decision-making process, whether those wishes were made orally or in written form. 
The wishes of parents may also play a role when the patient is a minor, but doctors may not be obliged to act in 
accordance with those wishes as the best interests of the child may take priority.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Euthanasia and assisted suicide are topics that are frequently debated within ethics and law. The 
Netherlands was the first Western country to authorize some forms of assisted suicide and 
euthanasia.1 Since then, more Western countries have authorized some forms of assisted dying, 
among which are Belgium, Luxemburg and Switzerland.2 In 2001, the first case regarding assisted 
suicide was examined by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or “the Court”).3 Since 
then the ECtHR has decided on several other end-of-life cases.4 On the one hand it has been 
established that Member States of the Council of Europe have an obligation to protect the right to 
life,5 but on the other hand the ECtHR has recognized that a right to decide how and when to die 
is an aspect the scope of article 8 in the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR or the 
Convention).6  
1.2. Research aim and research questions 
The aim of this thesis is to examine to what extent individuals can to choose the time and manner 
of their deaths in accordance with the ECHR. In order to answer this, the following questions will 
have to be examined; What are the competing rights and interests under the ECHR in relation to 
assisted dying? How have relevant articles of the Convention been interpreted by the ECtHR in 
end-of-life cases? Are States obliged to provide equal opportunity to commit suicide for all 
individuals? What is the role of consent in the decision-making process in end-of-life situations? 
1.3. Methodology, sources and limitations 
End-of-life subjects included in this thesis will be different forms of euthanasia and assisted 
suicide, while, in the interest of space, the topic of palliative care will be included only to a limited 
extent. The ECHR will be the basis for this thesis. Additional protocols to the Convention will be 
 
1 Paterson, Craig, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: A Natural Law Ethics Approach, 1st edn, Hamphshire, Ashgate, 
2008, p. 1 
2 Pareek, KK, Narsimulu, G, Medicine Update & Progress in Medicine 2019, New Delhi, Jaypee Brothers Medical 
Publisher, 2019, p. 1336 
3 Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 88, ECHR 2002-III 
4 See ‘European Court of Human Rights, End of Life and the European Convention on Human Rights’, 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Euthanasia_ENG.pdf, January 2018,  (End of life and the ECHR Factsheet), 
accessed 16 December 2019 
5 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, (ECHR), article 2 
6 Haas v. Switzerland, no. 31322/07, § 51, ECHR 2011 
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excluded, as relevant case law is based on provisions in the original treaty. The interpretations of 
the Convention in relation to the research questions of this thesis will be examined. The focus will 
be largely on case-law, namely on how the ECtHR has decided on the end-of-life issues that have 
been brought to the Court. Studying the case law of the ECtHR will give guidance as to which 
articles are relevant and how to interpret them with regards to assisted suicide and euthanasia. 
Some national cases will be included as well as opinions of legal scholars in order to further 
analyse alternatives in interpretation with regards to relevant articles as well as to questions that 
have not yet been addressed by the ECtHR. Some soft law instruments will also be included, as 
they can influence the practice of the organs of the Council of Europe and the member states, 
despite not being binding law.7 
Besides the judgements of the ECtHR, the thesis will be to a great extent based on writings of 
scholars such as Elizabeth Wicks, Gregor Puppinck and Claire de la Hougue. The most significant 
influence from scholars in the thesis will be the writings of Wicks, as her research is largely 
focused on human rights and health care law. She has written numerous books and articles on the 
topic, many of which are focused on end-of-life situations.8 There have been new cases in the end-
of-life sphere since many of Wick’s analyses. Some areas within the end-of-life sphere have been 
analysed in depth in more recent years. An example of this is Black’s analyses on refusing life-
prolonging treatment,9 which will be discussed in this thesis. A broader scope of end-of-life 
situations will be exammined in this thesis, including forms of passive euthanasia as well as active 
forms of assisted dying. This will allow comparisons to be made between the rights related to 
different forms of assisted dying and refusals to life-sustaining treatment (LST).  
1.4. Terminology 
It is challenging to find consistent definitions of terms related to end-of-life situations, as different 
terms are often used interchangeably by some, while others make a clear distinction between them. 
With the purpose of giving a general overview of the key terms that will be used in this thesis; 
definitions will be given below to the most reoccurring to the terms. 
 
7 Grabenwarter, Christoph, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights: Inherent Constitutional Tendencies and the 
Role of the European Court of Human Rights’, (2014), 1, Elte Law Journal, 101, p. 114 
8 See University of Leicester, ‘Elizabeth Wicks’, (University of Leicester) 
<https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/law/people/elizabeth-wicks>, accessed 28 January 2020 
9 Black, Isra, ‘Refusing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment and the ECHR’, (2018), 38 (2), Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, 299, p. 317  
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In this thesis active euthanasia refers to the physician or another individual administering the lethal 
substance to the patient.10  
Physician-assisted suicide, sometimes referred simply as assisted suicide11 can be described as a 
physician providing the patient with the means to commit suicide while it is the patient themselves 
who will ultimately use it to commit suicide. 12 Alternative terms excluding the word suicide, such 
as physician-assisted death, are also advocated by those who deem the word “suicide” to be biased 
and too emotionally charged.13  Some include assisted suicide under active euthanasia,14 while 
others argue that it should be differentiated from euthanasia as it does not involve another person 
directly killing the patient.15 The distinction between assisted suicide and euthanasia is not always 
clear in legislation either, as Switzerland is the only European country to clearly differentiate the 
two acts in its legislation.16 
Passive euthanasia is the withdrawing or withholding of LST.17 
The two types of euthanasia, active and passive, can further be divided into voluntary, involuntary 
and nonvoluntary forms of it. 
Voluntary euthanasia is when euthanasia is performed on a patient who requests it. 18 
Involuntary euthanasia is when euthanasia is performed on a patient who opposes it.19 
 
10 Amresh, Shrivastava, Kimbrell, Megan, Lester, David, Suicide From a Global Perspective: Vulnerable Populations 
and Controversies, 2nd edn, New York, Nova Science Publishers, Inc, 2012, p. 152 
11 While researching for this thesis it became clear that assisted suicide and physician-assisted suicide are often used 
interchangeably, see for example Lo, Bernard, Resolving Ethical Dilemmas A Guide for Clinicians, 4th edn, 
Philadelphia, Wolters Kluwer/Lippinicot Williams & Wilkins, 2009, p. 151-152 
12 Pareek, KK, Narsimulu, G, Medicine Update & Progress in Medicine 2019, New Delhi, Jaypee Brothers Medical 
Publisher, 2019, p. 1336 
13 Lo, (n 11), p. 152 
14 See Caldwell Stanford, Carla, Connor, Valarie J., Applied Law and Ethics for Health Professionals, 2nd edn, 
Burlington, Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2019, p. 129 
15 Sperling, Daniel, Suicide Tourism, 1st edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019, p.15 
16 Puppinck, Gregor, de la Hougue, Claire, ‘The Right to Assisted Suicide in the Case Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights’, (2014), 18 (7-8), The International Journal of Human Rights, p. 736 
17 Pozgar, George D., Legal and Ethical Issues for Health Professionals, 5th edn, Burlington, Jones & Bartlett 
Learning, 2019, p. 102 
18 Lo, (n 11), p. 151 
19 Ibid 
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Nonvoluntary euthanasia is when euthanasia is performed on a patient lacking decision-making 
capacity.20 
Assisted dying will be used in this thesis to describe any of the forms of assisted suicide or 
euthanasia described above.  
The following is the definition of palliative care used the World Health Organization: 
Palliative care is an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their families 
facing the problem associated with life-threatening illness, through the prevention and relief 
of suffering by means of early identification and impeccable assessment and treatment of 
pain and other problems, physical, psychosocial and spiritual21 
2. Relevant rights and interests of the ECHR 
2.1. Introduction to the ECHR 
The ECHR, which entered into force in 1953, was the first comprehensive human rights treaty 
formed after the Second World War.22 The Convention protects mainly civil and political rights.23 
The original treaty contains 59 articles24, but it has been complemented by protocols, six out of 
which contain substantial rights.25 As stated above, additional protocols will not be addressed in 
this thesis as the end-of-life case law has regarded provisions in the original treaty.  
Individuals of State Parties of the ECHR have the right under article 34 in the Convention to lodge 
a complaint to the ECtHR when they claim their rights have been violated by the State.26 In the 
case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom 27 the Court established the principle of the margin of 
appreciation. This margin of appreciation is connected to the principle of subsidiarity,28 means that 
national authorities have a primary task of ensuring the rights and liberties protected by the 
Convention. 29 When addressing article 10 in the case the Court stated that States do not have “an 
 
20 Ibid 
21 World Health Organization, ‘WHO definition of palliative care’,( 28 January 2012 World Health Organization), 
<https://www.who.int/cancer/palliative/definition/en/>, accessed 23 December 2019 
22 Schabas, William A., The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary, 1st edn, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2015, p. 1 
23 Bernadette, Rainey, Wicks, Elizabeth, Ovey, Clare, Jacobs, White, and Ovey: The European Convention on Human 
Rights, 7th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, p. 7 and 9 
24 ECHR, (n 5) 
25 Schabas, (n 22), p. 11 
26 ECHR, article 34, (n 5) 
27 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24 
28 Brems, Eva, ‘Positive Subsidiarity and Its Implications for the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’, (2019), 37(3), 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 210, p. 210-211 
29 Handyside, para. 48, (n 27) 
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unlimited power of appreciation”30 and that the Court, together with the Commission, “is 
responsible for ensuring the observance of those States' engagements (Article 19) (art. 19), is 
empowered to give the final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ is reconcilable with 
freedom of expression as protected by Article 10”31  
2.2. The right to life 
2.2.1. Generally about the right to life under the Convention 
The right to life, found in article 2 in the Convention,32 has been described by the ECtHR as “one 
of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention”.33 It is nonetheless not an absolute right.34 
The article states that: 
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save 
in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided 
by law. 
 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from 
the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
 (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
 (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; 
 (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.35 
 
Derogations from the Convention during times of emergency are addressed in article 15, where it 
is stated that the Convention allows “[n]o derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths 
resulting from lawful acts of war [...]”.36  
The right to life under the ECHR includes both negative and positive obligations on States. 
Negative obligations require States to refrain from a specific type of action, while positive 
obligations require States to take measures to ensure a certain outcome.37 The Court has interpreted 
article 2 (1) to mean that States have an obligation “not only to refrain from the intentional and 
unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its 
jurisdiction”.38  This can include in some circumstances a positive obligation to take measures to  
 
30 Ibid, para. 49 
31 Ibid 
32 ECHR, article 2, (n 5) 
33 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, § 147, Series A no. 324 
34 Park, Ian, The Right to Life in Armed Conflict, 1st edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 32 
35 ECHR, article 2, (n 5) 
36 Ibid, article 15 (2) 
37 Akandji-Kombe, Jean-François, Council of Europe, Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights: A guide to the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, January 2007, Human rights 
handbooks, No. 7, p. 11 
38 L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, § 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III 
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protect the right to life of an individual from life-threatening criminal actions of another 
individual.39 The Court has stated that “not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities 
a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materializing”.40 
The requirements the Court has set up for State authorities regarding the positive obligations to 
protect the right to life are that they “knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of 
a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third 
party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.”41 The Court has also affirmed that States’ 
positive obligations under article 2 includes the requirement to 
 make regulations compelling hospitals, whether public or private, to adopt appropriate measures for the 
protection of their patients' lives. They also require an effective independent judicial system to be set up so that 
the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical profession, whether in the public or the private sector, 
can be determined and those responsible made accountable.42 
2.2.2. The difficulty of defining life and death 
Due to advances in medical technology the question of when life ends no longer has a clear-cut 
answer. In the past a person has normally been considered dead once they stop breathing or when 
their heart stops beating. Death can no longer be defined that simply, as a patient in that state can 
now be revived with the help of modern medical technology. The traditional definition of death 
may thus be outdated.43 Many different suggestions have been proposed on what criteria must be 
fulfilled in modern times to determine that a person has died. These suggestions have included for 
example cessation of all activity of the whole brain, cessation of activities of the higher brain and 
brain stem death.44 The definition of death can depend on several different factors such as culture 
and religious beliefs.45 
Article 2 in the Convention states that “[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by law”46 , but 
when life begins, or ends, is not defined in the ECHR. Neither the former European Commission 
of Human Rights (the Commission), nor the Court has given a clear definition on life.47 The 
 
39 Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, § 115, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII 
40 Ibid, § 116 
41 Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401/02, § 129, ECHR 2009 
42 Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, § 49, ECHR 2002-I 
43 Wicks, Elizabeth, The Right to Life and Conflicting Interests, 1st edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 9 
44 Ibid, p. 9-11 
45 Ibid, p. 13-14 
46 ECHR, (n 5), article 2 
47 Korff, Douwe, Council of Europe, The right to life: A guide to the implementation of Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, November 2006, Human rights handbooks, No. 8, p. 8 
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Court’s reluctance to define the term “life” is evident in Vo v. France, a case regarding an unborn 
child. It held that determining whether an unborn child has the right to life fell within the margin 
of appreciation of States.48  
2.2.3. Application of article 2 at the end of life 
One might argue that when a person is approaching the end of their life, the right to life is not 
important to protect compared to an individual whose life is further away from ending. Wicks, 
however, argues that the length of the life expectation does not affect the protection of the right to 
life. On the contrary, she argues that when an individual’s life is nearing the end the right to life 
becomes more important, as this may be the most valued days of that individual’s life. It is also at 
the end of one’s life when the right to life is often the most threatened. This is especially true when 
life is coming to an end due to illness or injury, both of which in and of themselves cause a threat 
to life, but also due to the vulnerable position the patient is in and the added medical treatment.49  
Wicks presents two main arguments for why a person who will die does not have a weaker 
protection of the right to life. The first argument is the difficulty of assessing the certitude of a 
coming death.  The second argument she brings forward concerns the question of why a person 
approaching death would be less entitled to protection of life than someone who is not. All humans 
will die at some point and any decision of a certain point in time where a person is no longer 
entitled to enjoy human rights is inevitably an arbitrary one.50 
Another relevant issue is the situation of patients who are unconscious, mentally incapacitated or 
lack self-awareness. Wicks argues that such patients enjoy the protection of the right to life as well. 
She describes the right to life as starting the moment an individual is considered a viable human 
being,51 and as prevailing until the moment of brain death. Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
life will always be preserved regardless of the circumstances.52 
 
48 Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00, § 82, ECHR 2004-V 
49 Wicks, Elizabeth, ‘Challenging some myths about the right to life at the end of life. 1: Not an absolute right’, (2011), 
6 (4), Clinical Ethics, 167, p. 167 
50 Wicks, Elizabeth, ‘Challenging some myths about the right to life at the end of life. 2: Reinstating the Ethically 
Excluded’, (2012), 7(1), Clinical Ethics, 24, p. 26 
51 The issue regarding when life begins will only be mentioned briefly in this paper, as it is not relevant to the 
discussion of the paper. 
52 Wicks, (n 49), p. 167-168 
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2.2.4. Circumstances that give rise to a positive obligation to prevent suicide 
The positive obligation of States to protect the right to life under article 2 in the Convention can 
extend to a positive obligation to prevent suicide in certain situations. This obligation applies when 
an individual is under the control of a State, for example when they are a prisoner. What is expected 
from authorities in such a situation is that, if they know or ought to know that an individual is at a 
risk of suicide, they do everything that can reasonably be expected of them in order to prevent it.53  
The case of Keenan v. the United Kingdom54 concerned the issue of suicide committed by a 
schizophrenic individual who was detained.55 The Court found no violation of article 2 in the case, 
as it held that the authorities had not acted negligently with regard to the suicide risk of the 
prisoner.56 Daniel Rietiker interprets the case as establishing that the obligation to prevent suicide 
is restricted and dependent on the circumstances of the case. He argues furthermore that even if 
not completely apparent in the case, the national authorities were forced to consider other rights 
besides the right to life that the prisoner had under the Convention. According to Rietiker, they 
had to consider for example rights under article 8, as they could have violated the prisoner’s rights 
had they organised a permanent supervision of the prisoner.57 The obligation for States to prevent 
suicide when an individual is under its control has also applied in situations beyond prisons,58 such 
as during a compulsory military service.59 
Wicks argues that the obligation on States to prevent suicides of detained individuals is due to the 
restricted autonomy of such individuals, in addition to detention often generating depression and 
suicidal thoughts. The prisoner’s lives are at a greater risk compared to those not detained. 60 In 
the Keenan case the Court stated that 
The prison authorities, similarly, must discharge their duties in a manner compatible with the rights and 
freedoms of the individual concerned. There are general measures and precautions which will be available to 
diminish the opportunities for self-harm, without infringing on personal autonomy. Whether any more stringent 
measures are necessary in respect of a prisoner and whether it is reasonable to apply them will depend on the 
circumstances of the case.61 
 
53 Wicks, (n 43), p. 189 
54 Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, ECHR 2001-II 
55 Ibid, para. 10-14 
56 Ibid, para. 98 
57 Rietiker, Daniel, ‘From Prevention to Facilitation - Suicide in the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR in the light of the 
Recent Haas v. Switzerland Judgment’, (2012), 25, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 85, p. 101 
58 Wicks, (n 43), p. 190 
59 Abdullah Yılmaz v. Turkey, no. 21899/02, 17 June 2008 
60 Wicks, (n 43), p. 191 
61 Keenan, (n 54), para. 92 
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According to Wicks’ interpretation of this paragraph, this is a clear indication that it is necessary 
and reasonable in some situations to infringe on a suicidal prisoner’s personal autonomy to save 
their life.62 Even so, Wicks argues that autonomy is not completely irrelevant. Despite the cases 
where the Court has found a violation when a State has failed to prevent suicide, Wicks argues that 
if an individual who is mentally competent makes the decision to end their life, States are under 
no obligation to prevent that individual from committing suicide. This is, according to her, because 
the positive obligation to protect the right to life does not apply when there is a substantial 
conflicting interest, such as an autonomous decision to commit suicide.63 The topic of autonomy 
as a conflicting interest to the right to life in end-of-life cases will be addressed further in chapter 
3.3. 
2.2.5. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on assisted dying 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has commented on the topic of 
euthanasia on a few occasions. In 1976 the PACE stated in Recommendation 779 (1976) that a 
doctor “has no right, even in cases which appear to him to be desperate, intentionally to hasten the 
natural course of death”.64 In 1999 the PACE stated in paragraph 9 of Recommendation 1418 that 
it upholds “the prohibition against intentionally taking the life of terminally ill or dying persons”.65 
It also acknowledged that the right to life of terminally ill and dying individuals is guaranteed 
under article 266 and that the wish of the patient to die does not constitute “any legal claim to die 
at the hand of another person” 67 and that it “cannot of itself constitute a legal justification to carry 
out actions intended to bring about death”.68 Later, in 2012, the PACE stated in Resolution 1859 
which regarded the protection of human rights and dignity that “[e]thanasia, in the sense of the 
intentional killing by act or omission of a dependent human being for his or her alleged benefit, 
must always be prohibited.”69 
 
62 Wicks, (n 43), p. 191 
63 Ibid, p.193-194 
64 Parliamentary Assembly Origin - Assembly debate on 28 January 1976 (23rd Sitting) (see Doc. 3699, report of the 
Committee on Social and Health Questions). Text adopted by the Assembly on 29 January 1976 (24th Sitting), para.  
65 The Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, Recommendation 1418 Protection of the human rights and 
dignity of the terminally ill the dying, adopted by the Assembly on 25 June 1999 (24th Sitting), para. 9 (c) 
66 Ibid, para. 9.3.1. 
67 Ibid, para. 9.3.2. 
68 Ibid, para. 9.3.3. 
69 The Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, Resolution 1859 Protecting human rights and dignity by taking 
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2.2.6. Active versus passive euthanasia regarding article 2 
One question that arises about a State’s obligation to protect life in end-of-life situations, is whether 
there is a difference between killing and letting die. From a philosophical perspective, one might 
argue that there is a difference. Hugh V. Mclachlan takes this position. He argues that omission 
cannot cause something to happen. He argues that an omission by a doctor to for example prescribe 
antibiotics to a patient may indirectly lead to death, and can be immoral, but is not active killing.70 
He compares it to a situation with a drowning child. He argues that everyone has both a moral and 
a legal responsibility not to drown a child, but we do not have the same type of responsibility to 
save a drowning child. To drown a child would be considered murder, while not saving a drowning 
child is not, albeit the person who failed to save the child may be guilty of failing to comply his 
duty of care. He argues that killing and letting die are different both from a moral and a legal 
presentative and thus active and passive euthanasia should be differentiated.71 
The opposing opinion is that omissions do cause death. E. Gerald and S. Wilkinson argue that the 
omission to save a drowning child and the omission of a doctor to prescribe antibiotics to a patient 
who needs them in order to stay alive does cause death. They argue that both permissible and 
impermissible omissions cause death. To illustrate their argument, they take as an example a 
scenario where 10 patients are receiving LST. If it is in the best interest for three of them to die, 
while for the other patients it is not, then switching off the treatment is nevertheless the cause of 
death for all patients. They also address the argument that in passive euthanasia of a terminally ill 
patient it is the disease that kills the patient rather than an action. They dismiss the argument by 
holding that this argument would have to apply to active euthanasia as well, since in the case of a 
terminally ill patient who requests active euthanasia, the underlying cause is the disease. It does 
not therefore address the issue of how passive euthanasia supposedly does not cause death.72 
The ECtHR has addressed this issue to some extent in the case of Lambert and others v. France,73 
which concerned the withdrawal of LST of a patient. 74 This case of passive euthanasia which will 
be presented in more detail in chapter 4.1.1. It stated that it “stresses that the issue before it in the 
 
70 McLachlan, Hugh V., The ethics of killing and letting die: active and passive euthanasia, (2008), 34, Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 636, p. 637 
71 Ibid, p. 637-638 
72 Garrard, E., Wilkinson, S., ‘Passive euthanasia’, (2005), 31(2), Journal of Medical Ethics, 64, p. 66 
73 Lambert and Others v. France [GC], no. 46043/14, ECHR 2015 (extracts) 
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present case is not that of euthanasia, but rather the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment”.75 This 
can be perceived as the Court wanting to draw a clear distinction between the withdrawing of LST, 
i.e. letting the patient die from his condition, and providing a patient with the means to end their 
own life, i.e. ending the life of the patient in a more direct way. The majority in the case therefore 
seems to have taken a similar approach as Mclachlan. 
 The partly dissenting judges in the case disagreed on the fact that the withdrawal of LST from the 
patient would not be one of euthanasia. The partly dissenting judges state the following: 
We agree that, conceptually, there is a legitimate distinction between euthanasia and assisted suicide on the 
one hand, and therapeutic abstention on the other. However, because of the manner in which domestic law has 
been interpreted and the way it has been applied to the facts of the case under examination, we strongly disagree 
with what is stated in paragraph 141 of the present judgment. The case before this Court is one of euthanasia, 
even if under a different name.76 
The partly dissenting judges seem to take an approach similar to Gerald and Wilkinson, as they 
hold that withdrawing the LST “results in precipitating death which would not otherwise occur in 
the foreseeable future”.77 They emphasize that the treatment in the case was of ordinary care and 
that in lack of the consequence will inevitably be his death. They add that 
[o]ne may not will the death of the subject in question, but by willing the act or omission which one knows 
will in all likelihood lead to that death, one actually intends to kill that subject nonetheless. This is, after all, 
the whole notion of positive indirect intent as one of the two limbs of the notion of dolus in criminal law.78 
The partly dissenting judges in the Lambert case therefore disagreed with the definition of 
euthanasia implied by the majority. 
In analysing a domestic case from the United Kingdom concerning the withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition and hydration (ANH) from a patient in a permanent  vegetative state,  Emily Jackson 
notes that the domestic law seemingly recognizes that sometimes it is not in the patient’s best 
interests to be kept alive in a permanent vegetative state. She raises an important question, namely 
why the law allows for the slow death by dehydration and starvation of a patient, while 
condemning directly killing a patient in a faster manner through a lethal injection.79 The same 
question could be posed regarding the French law, as the direct killing of Vincent Lambert would 
 
75 Ibid, para. 141 
76 Lambert and Others v. France [GC], no. 46043/14, ECHR 2015 (extracts), Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges 
Hajiyev, Šikuta, Tsotsoria, de Gaetano and Griҭco, para. 9 
77 Ibid, para. 3 
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79 Jackson, Emily, Keown, John, Debating Euthanasia,1st edn, Oxford, Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011, p. 36-37 
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have been against the domestic law, while starving and dehydrating him to death was authorized.80 
The majority of the Court agreed with the French government, separating cases of direct killing 
and withdrawing LST.  
Jackson addresses a possible counter argument to the view that withdrawing LST should not be 
separated from direct killing. The counter argument is that withdrawing the LST does not kill the 
patient, but it is rather the underlying condition that ends up killing the patient. Jackson is not 
convinced by this argument, as that would mean that doctors may stand back and watch a patient 
die from an easily treatable condition, which is normally not acceptable behaviour from doctors. 
She takes the example of a patient entering a hospital severely dehydrated and doctors deciding 
not to help despite there being a simple solution to the condition. Could the doctors really justify 
their actions by saying that it was the underlying condition, namely severe dehydration, that killed 
the patient rather than their omission to act? 81 As Jackson argues, withholding or withdrawing 
LST can only be acceptable when letting the patient die is acceptable. In other words, it is not the 
act of withdrawing LST in itself that is an acceptable way of killing someone, but it is rather the 
circumstances the patient is in that makes it acceptable to let them die.82 
Jackson is in general critical of the distinction between killing and letting die. While she recognizes 
that there are some differences between withdrawing LST and injecting a lethal substance into a 
patient, she does not hold them to be significant enough to justify the bearing of “the moral weight 
that is placed upon them by law”.83 If taking a terminal cancer patient who no longer benefits from 
chemotherapy as an example, the alternative of withdrawing treatment instead of a lethal injection 
is a slower and perhaps more painful and distressful death. Jackson poses the question of why 
withdrawing the treatment would be the preferable solution when the end result in both scenarios 
is the same, death.84 
As seen above, one argument for the alternative of withdrawal of treatment is that the underlying 
condition is what causes the death, whereas in the case of a lethal injection it is the injection that 
causes the death of the patient. However, as Jackson explains, this is not necessarily the case. If a 
 
80 See footnote 472 
81 Jackson, Keown, (n 79), p. 36-37 
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terminally ill cancer patient receives ANH, and this treatment is withdrawn, its it is not the cancer 
that kills the patient, but rather starvation and dehydration.85 
Another possible argument could be that the difference lies on the moral distinction in taking a 
positive action to cause harm versus failing to prevent harm from happening. As Jackson notes, 
this may indeed be a valid argument in some cases. A person who does not donate to an 
organization that helps save lives could hardly be accused of murder, while someone poisoning a 
baby’s milk and thereby causing that baby’s death could reasonably be held morally accountable 
for the death of the baby. Jackson argues however that this would not be the case in the terminally 
ill cancer patient. The alternatives of a lethal injection versus withdrawing ANH are not the same 
as in the previously expressed example. She is not convinced that there is any moral difference 
between a doctor injecting the patient with a lethal injection versus the doctor withdrawing the 
treatment. Again, it is not the way that the doctor causes the death that is acceptable, but rather the 
death of the patient due to circumstances that must be acceptable. Jackson holds that the way the 
patient is allowed to die should promote dignity as well as reflect the values held by the patient 
during his or her lifetime.86 
When considering the argument presented by Jackson, it could be seen as rather odd how the Court, 
as well as the French law, seem to separate assisted suicide and active euthanasia on the one hand 
and withdrawing LST on the other hand. An alternative possibility could be that due to positive 
obligations States have under article 2, omissions that lead to death can breach the article and 
therefore the distinction between active and passive euthanasia would be irrelevant under the 
article. Such a view has been taken by Wicks, who argues that under article 2 of the ECHR, it is 
of little relevance whether a person is killed by an act or an omission. As States have a duty to take 
reasonable steps to preserve life, she deems it self-evident that an omission can infringe the 
obligation.87 However, if the Court holds the same view as Wicks, it would seem slightly 
contradictory that it wanted to emphasize that the Lambert case was not one of euthanasia. 
Nonetheless, judging by the Lambert case, it seems rather clear that  the Court does not consider 
withdrawing LST from a patient in a persistent vegetative state to be a breach of the right to life, 
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87 Wicks, Elizabeth, ‘When is life not in our own best interests: The best interests test as an unsatisfactory exception 
to the right to life in the context of permanent vegetative state cases’, (2013), 13(1), Medical Law International, 75, 
p.87 
 
Vivi Ahtiainen 
14 
 
at least as long as it is done with respect to the previous wishes of the patient.  This does not seem 
to differ considerably from how the Court has interpreted the article in relation to assisted suicide, 
where the requirement of an autonomous decision of the patient has been emphasized. Perhaps the 
most obvious difference between assisted suicide cases and the Lambert case is the lack of 
emphasis on the protection of the vulnerable in the Lambert case. This was also noted by the partly 
dissenting judges in the Lambert case. They stated that “[w]e find that conclusion not only 
frightening but – and we very much regret having to say this – tantamount to a retrograde step in 
the degree of protection which the Convention and the Court have hitherto afforded to vulnerable 
people.”88 
2.3. The prohibition of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment  
Another article in the Convention that may be relevant in cases of assisted dying is article 3, which 
states that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”.89 The argument concerning the applicability article 3 assisted dying is that denying 
someone the chance to end their unbearable suffering through assisted dying could amount to 
inhumane and degrading treatment.90 Article 3 includes the positive obligation to protect 
individuals from ill-treatment, whether from public or private parties.91 The Court has considered 
article 3 to be an absolute prohibition and has stated that it “enshrines one of the fundamental 
values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe”.92 No exceptions are listed 
under the article93 and derogations from it are not allowed under article 15.94 Therefore, if a 
prohibition of assisted dying was to be deemed to be in breach of article 3, the prohibition could 
not be justified.  
The absolute nature of article 3 has been demonstrated by the Court in cases such as Chahal v. the 
United Kingdom95 and Saadi v. Italy.96 In the Chahal case the Court held that deporting the 
applicant to India, where he would be at risk of being subject to ill-treatment within the meaning 
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of article 3, would be in violation of the article,97 despite reason behind the potential deportation 
was to protect national security.98 In the Saadi case the Court held that holding a higher standard 
of proof regarding the potential risk of ill-treatment when deporting an individual would be 
contrary to the absolute nature of article 3, even if the individual in question poses a threat to 
national security.99 Suffering caused by an illness can fall within the scope of article 3, if a State’s 
actions cause it to aggravate. Such was the case in D v. the United Kingdom100 where the State 
would have breached article 3, had the State deported the applicant who suffered from AIDS to St 
Kitts, where he would have died without the medical and palliative care he needed.101  
In Ireland v. the United Kingdom102 the Court noted that for ill-treatment to fall within the scope 
of article 3 it must “attain a minimum level of severity”.103 This standard must be met regardless 
of the type of conduct in question. Therefore, even illegal conduct must meet this criterion in order 
to fall within the scope of article 3.104 In the case of Jalloh v. Germany,105 the Court commented 
on the assessment of the minimum level of severity, stating that “it depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects 
and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim”.106 For a prohibition of assisted 
dying to breach article 3, it would therefore have to reach this minimum level of severity.   
In the Ireland v. the United Kingdom case the Court described degrading treatment as arousing 
“feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly 
breaking their physical or moral resistance.”107 In assessing whether treatment has been degrading 
the Court had taken into consideration whether it had the object to “humiliate and debase the person 
concerned”.108 However, an intention to humiliate need not necessarily be present, as was shown 
for example in the Peers v. Greece case,109 where the Court held that despite the lack of such intent 
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in the case, the possibility of a violation of article 3 still existed.110 In V v. the United Kingdom111 
the Court noted that the suffering and humiliation caused by an inhumane or degrading treatment 
or punishment must “go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with 
a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment”.112 When it comes to medical treatment, the 
Court has stated that generally “a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot be regarded as 
inhuman or degrading”.113  
In the inadmissibility decision X v. Germany,114 the applicant was a German man under arrest, 
during which he went on a hunger strike, which resulted in him being force-fed. He complained 
that he had been subject to inhumane and degrading treatment by being force-fed and that his rights 
under article 3 in the Convention had therefore been breached. The European Commission of 
Human Rights “forced feeding of a person does involve degrading elements which in certain 
circumstances may be regarded as prohibited by Art. 3 in the Convention”115 but held that it is: 
[…]satisfied that the authorities acted solely in the best interest of the applicant when choosing between either 
respect for the applicant’s will not to accept nourishment of any kind and thereby incur the risk that he might 
be subject to lasting injuries or even die, or to take action with a view to securing his survival although such 
action might infringe the applicant’s human dignity116 
2.4. The right to private life 
The right to respect for private and family life is found under article 8117 in the ECHR and states 
that: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.  
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.118 
 
Article 8 in the Convention becomes relevant through the argument that individuals have a right 
to end their own life based on the principle of personal autonomy.119 The Court has established 
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that “ ‘private life’ is a broad term encompassing the sphere of personal autonomy within which 
everyone can freely pursue the development and fulfilment of his or her personality and to 
establish and develop relationships with other persons and the outside world”.120 PACE stated in 
Resolution 428 (1970) that the right to private life “consists essentially in the right to live one's 
own life with a minimum of interference”.121 States are not obliged under the Convention to 
provide citizens a specific level of medical care,122 but the Court has stated that “private life 
includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity”123 and that “health, together with 
physical and moral integrity, falls within the realm of private life”.124  
The seconds paragraph of article 8 lists justifications for state interference with the exercise of the 
rights listed in the first paragraph. The rights protected under the article are thus not absolute. The 
Court has described the object of article 8 as being “essentially that of protecting an individual 
against an arbitrary interference by the public authorities”.125 In addition to negative obligations, 
States have positive obligations under the article as well. This was underlined by the Court for 
example in the of Dickson v. the United Kingdom126 where it stated that:  
In addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective 
respect for private and family life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure 
respect for private and family life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. 127 
When two rights are at conflict with each other, a balancing must be made between those rights, 
which means that sometimes an interference with article 8 is permitted in order to protect 
another right, as long as the interference is proportionate to the aim it pursues.128 Accordingly, 
if assisted dying is protected by article 8, it does not automatically mean that a State cannot 
justify such a prohibition under the article, as the prohibition may be justified under article 8(2). 
The margin of appreciation under article 8 will be restricted “[w]here a particularly important 
facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake”,129 while it will be wider where “there 
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is no consensus within the member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative 
importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly 
where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues”.130 
What is meant with “in accordance with law” under article 8 (2) is that the interference with the 
article must be a recognized in the national law, including statutory law and judge made law.131 
Moreover, the law must be adequately foreseeable and accessible.132 The assessment of a 
legitimate aim under article 8 (2) is often rather insignificant, as the list under the article covers 
a large amount of government activity. The Court has also often allowed the terms to be applied 
in a somewhat broad and liberal manner.133 What the Court usually focuses on the most is the 
requirement that the interference is “necessary in a democratic society”.134 This entails that fair 
balance must be struck between the interests of the individual and the interests of the 
community as a whole.135 The interference must therefore be proportionate, which furthermore 
entails that if the measure the State has taken could have been achieved with a smaller burden 
on the individual, it may not pass the proportionality test.136 
2.5. The freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
The freedom of thought, conscience and religion is protected under article 9137 in the Convention. 
The article states that: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change 
his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.  
 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.138 
 
The freedom to believe and to worship may be a vital part of an individual’s personality. This is 
especially true to individuals with religious beliefs.139 The Court has nevertheless noted that the 
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freedom “is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned”.140 One 
argument concerning article 9 and assisted dying is that assisted dying as a manifestation of belief 
protected by article 9. 141 Another argument is the that assisted dying could be protected by article 
9, if it is performed as a conscious objection by someone who does not believe death needs to be 
natural. 142 
The right to believe and to change one’s beliefs is an absolute right, whereas the right to manifest 
such beliefs is subject to limitations under article 9 (2), as this can affect others.143 Jim Murdoch 
has interpreted the scope of article 9 to be rather narrow in practice, despite the terms “thought, 
conscious and religion” suggesting a potentially wide scope. He mentions that a “belief” is not the 
same as an “opinion”.144 A personal beliefs must “attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, 
cohesion and importance”145 and that it must be considered to be compatible with respect for 
human dignity.146 The possible obligations States have under article 9 was put forward by the Court 
in the case of Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria, where the Court  stated that States must “ensure 
the peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed under Article 9 (art. 9) to the holders of those beliefs 
and doctrines”.147 
The permissible limitations under article 9 (2) are similar to those listed under article 8 (2), while 
containing some differences.148 Similarly to article 8 (2), the interference must be in accordance 
with national law,149 as well as accessible and foreseeable.150 Interferences with the article must 
have a legitimate aim, which must be interpreted narrowly.151 Unlike article 8 (2), article 9 (2) 
does not list “national security” as legitimate aim. The Court has commented on the subject stating 
that  
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Far from being an accidental omission, the non-inclusion of that particular ground for limitations in Article 9 
reflects the primordial importance of religious pluralism as “one of the foundations of a ‘democratic 
society’ within the meaning of the Convention” and the fact that a State cannot dictate what a person believes 
or take coercive steps to make him change his beliefs152 
The interference must also be “necessary in a democratic society”, meaning that, again like 
under article 8 (2), it the individual’s interests must be balanced against the community’s 
interests.153 
2.6. The prohibition of discrimination 
An argument regarding equality is occasionally used in support of assisted suicide. It is claimed 
that a prohibition of assisted suicide leads to inequality between those who are physically able to 
commit suicide and those who are unable to do so due to their physical limitations.154 Article 14 
in the Convention concerns discrimination and states that: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
As the grounds in the article includes “other status”, it is possible for discrimination to be based 
on another status than those listed in the article.155 There are two lines of case law when it comes 
to the scope of the “other status”; one which suggests a narrow interpretation of other status, 
encompassing only personal characteristics as a basis of comparison and a wider interpretation, 
which can include any situation.156 An example of a narrow interpretation can be found in Budak 
and Others v. Turkey where the Court stated that it “reiterates that Article 14 is not concerned with 
all differences of treatment but only with differences having as their basis or reason a personal 
characteristic (“status”) by which persons or group of persons are distinguishable from each 
other”.157 A wider interpretation of what can be included under “other status” is found for example 
in Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, where the Court emphasized that the grounds listed under 
the article were illustrative rather than exhaustive.158 Disability has been found to fall within the 
“other status” of article 14.159 Rainey, Wicks and Ovey argue nevertheless that if the ground for 
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differentiation is a personal characteristic it is more likely that it will be considered to be 
encompassed by article 14.160 What differentiates article 14 in the Convention from other articles 
treated in this thesis is that claims made under this article must be in conjunction to a substantive 
right under the Convention, meaning that one cannot invoke the article alone.161 A breach of a 
substantive provision is nevertheless not required in order to find a breach of article 14.162 
Discrimination can be either direct or indirect. The Court has described direct discrimination as a 
“difference in the treatment of persons in analogous, or relevantly similar, situations”.163 However, 
direct discrimination can also arise when a State treats people who are in vastly different situations 
the same.164 The assessment of when and what factors may justify a differential treatment of 
individuals in similar situations falls within the margin of appreciation of States.165 In the case of 
Thlimmenos v. Greece166 the State was found to have violated article 14 as it failed to treat persons 
in different situations differently.167 The complaint was made in conjunction with article 9. 168 The 
applicant was a Jehovah’s Witness who was convicted for subordination, as he refused to wear a 
military uniform.169 The applicant was not appointed to a post of chartered accountant due to him 
refusing to do military service because of his religious beliefs. This decision was made without 
differentiating the applicant from other persons convicted of a serious crime, despite the applicant 
committing the crime because he was exercising his religious freedom.170 
The Court has also described indirect discrimination171 by stating that a “difference in treatment 
may take the form of disproportionately prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure which, 
though couched in neutral terms, discriminates against a group”.172 When it comes to positive 
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obligations under article 14, the Court has stated that a violation can occur either by “positive 
action on the part of the State or by a failure to ensure non-discrimination […]”.173  
Not all forms of inequalities will be in breach of article 14.174 In the Belgian linguistics case175 the 
Court stated that it 
[…] holds that the principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no objective and 
reasonable justification. The existence of such a justification must be assessed in relation to the aim and effects 
of the measure under consideration, regard being had to the principles which normally prevail in democratic 
societies. A difference of treatment in the exercise of a right laid down in the Convention must not only pursue 
a legitimate aim: Article 14 (art. 14) is likewise violated when it is clearly established that there is no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.176 
The idea behind such an approach on discrimination is that the grounds stated in the article are not 
in and of themselves a justification to treat individuals or groups differently, but that such a 
differential treatment may be acceptable due to the aim of the measure taken.177 
In order to determine whether a disadvantageous treatment is due to one of the grounds listed under 
article 14, the Court may examine whether the individual claiming to be a victim of a violation of 
the article can be properly compared to a group of individuals who are being treated more 
advantageously. This test requires that the applicant and the group of individuals they are being 
compared to are in an analogous situation in all material respects.178 The Court has examined for 
example whether a woman who was transgender was in a similar situation as someone who is 
cisgender or an unmarried transgender when it came to the obtaining of a female identity 
number.179 As Bernadette et al. note,180 when it comes to a State’s argument that a differential 
treatment has a legitimate aim in accordance with article 8 (2), it is not enough to show that such 
an aim exists, but also that the action taken by the State aids in fulfilling that aim.181 
Another important issue to consider under the article is proportionality. When a fundamental right 
of an individual is at stake, the means used by the State to achieve an aim must not be of a 
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disproportionate nature. In other words, the means are proportionate if the aim could not be 
achieved by means that would interfere less with the individual’s rights.182 States are granted a 
margin of appreciation, which varies in extent, with regard to the assessment of prohibited 
differential treatment. Whether or not differential treatment can be justified may also change in 
time, as conditions can change, as well as the prevailing consensus among Member States. 183 
Whether or not there is common ground on an issue among Member States affects the 
permissibility of differential treatment.184 
3. Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia under the ECHR 
3.1. A right to die within the right to life? 
Pretty v. the United Kingdom was the first case where the Court had to decide on whether article 
2 in the Convention also contains a right to die.185 There was one inadmissibility decision before 
the Pretty case, namely the case of Sanles Sanles v. Spain186. The applicant in the case was the heir 
legally appointed by a man named Mr. Sampedro who has been tetraplegic for 30 years after an 
accident and wanted a dignified death. By the time the case was brought to the Court Mr. Sampedro 
had already committed suicide with the help of a third party and the case was declared inadmissible 
since the applicant could not claim to be a victim of the articles her complaint was based on.187 
The Pretty case concerned a citizen of the United Kingdom named Diane Pretty, a 43-year-old 
woman who suffered from a motor neuron disease and was paralyzed from the neck down due to 
the disease. She was also not able to speak properly and was fed through a tube. The disease had 
developed to an advanced stage and the applicant was expected to die within months. The usual 
way of dying for patients suffering from the disease is through respiratory failure and pneumonia. 
The disease did not affect the applicant’s intellect or capacity to make decisions. The applicant 
wanted to avoid the suffering and indignity that was awaiting her if she died naturally through the 
progression of the disease and wished to be able to control the way she would die.188  
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Since the applicant was not able to commit suicide on her own, she wished for her husband to 
assist her, which was illegal under domestic law.189 The applicant had asked the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) for an undertaking not to prosecute her husband if he assisted in her suicide, 
but the DPP refused.190 The applicant appealed to domestic courts without the success to have the 
decision of the DPP dismissed or showing that the domestic law was incompatible with the 
Convention.191 The articles the applicant invoked before the Court were articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14.192 
The applicant’s claim under article 2 of the Convention was that if the Court did not find a violation 
of article 2 when her husband is not permitted to assist in his wife’s suicide, it would mean that 
the States that do permit assisted suicide are in violation of the article. The applicant also claimed 
that article 2 includes a right to choose whether one wants to continue living. She claimed that 
article 2 was only meant to protect individuals from intervention to the right to life from third 
parties, not the individual themselves.193 
The Court held that States have an obligation to protect life and that despite some articles in the 
Convention, such as article 11, containing a negative aspect to them, article 2 cannot be interpreted 
as containing a negative aspect to it. It held that the article is “unconcerned with issues to do with 
the quality of living or what a person chooses to do with his or her life”.194 The Court clarified that 
the article “cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically 
opposite right, namely a right to die; nor can it create a right to self-determination in the sense of 
conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose death rather than life.”195 Rietiker interprets 
this statement made by the Court as an indication of the Court’s reluctance to apply what he calls 
a “dynamic” or “evolutive” interpretation of the Convention196 and stresses that it is established in 
the Court’s case law that the Court “should not depart, without cogent reason, from precedents laid 
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down in previous cases”.197 He agrees however with the Court’s statement, concluding that to 
interpret article 2 as containing implicitly a right to die would indeed be far-fetched.198  
Rietiker also notes that as such a fundamental right as the right to life is at play, it is unlikely that 
the Court would interpret other Convention rights to be superior to it when they are in conflict with 
the fundamental right, even when the Convention is interpreted “as a whole”. As he notes, the 
findings under article 2 did indeed dominate the findings of the other claims that the applicant 
presented before the Court in Pretty. He argues that this judgement gives States a basis for 
criminalizing assistance in suicide by obliging States to investigate all deaths. As he notes 
however, assisted suicide is an area that automatically includes complex moral and ethical 
considerations. Assisted suicide is therefore more controversial than situations where States clearly 
have an obligation to prevent suicide and other forms of self-harm, namely in cases such as 
prisoners which was addressed above.199 States therefore enjoy a wider margin of appreciation as 
well regarding assisted suicide.200 
As to the applicants claim that if the Court does not find a violation of article 2 in her case it would 
mean that States that do permit assistance in a person’s suicide, the Court held that ” [i]t is not for 
the Court in this case to attempt to assess whether or not the state of law in any other country fails 
to protect the right to life”201 and that  
even if circumstances prevailing in a particular country which permitted assisted suicide were found not to 
infringe Article 2 of the Convention, that would not assist the applicant in this case, where the very different 
proposition – that the United Kingdom would be in breach of its obligations under Article 2 if it did not allow 
assisted suicide – has not been established.202 
 
Mathieu Bertrand argues that it is indisputable that authorizing euthanasia is a breach of article 2 
in the Convention, since it is executed either directly by the public authorities or under the 
supervision of them.  He also argues that the patient consenting to the killing does not affect a 
State’s obligation under article 2, which, as he mentions, includes no specified exception regarding 
euthanasia.203 He adds, however, that despite the fact that many constitutional court judgements 
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have on the basis of the prohibition on deliberate killings supported euthanasia bans, the ECtHR 
has started to develop a different approach on the issue. He supposes that it is due to the 
development of national laws in Europe regarding euthanasia.204 When he talks more generally 
about the nature of the right to life (not only the right to life under the ECHR), he argues that the 
right to life is a right, not a freedom, and that it only includes the right to protection of life, not a 
right for individuals to decide what they want to do with their lives. He argues that suicide is a 
personal freedom but not a right and that States are under no obligation to help individuals in 
committing suicide.205 Panos Merkouris argues that despite the positive obligation of States to take 
measures to protect life, other rights under the Convention, such as the right to privacy, have to be 
considered when fulfilling that obligation.206  
 
So far, the ECtHR has addressed a situation in which a person has been actively euthanized or has 
received aid in committing suicide against the wishes, or in the absence of knowledge, of a loved 
one. There is a pending application, Mortier v. Belgium, which concerns this exact situation.  The 
applicant’s mother, who suffered from chronic depression, was euthanatized in Belgium without 
the knowledge of the applicant and his sister. The applicant claims that article 2 was violated as 
the State failed to protect his mother’s life, as he held that the domestic law concerning euthanasia 
were not respected in his mother’s case.  He also complains that his right to mental integrity and 
family life under article 8 were breached.207 Whether the Court finds a violation of any of the 
Convention articles remains to be seen. 
3.2. Prohibition of assisted suicide and euthanasia as degrading treatment 
The applicant in the Pretty case argued that the suffering she was forced to undergo if she was 
forced to die naturally constituted a degrading treatment under article 3 of the Convention. The 
applicant did not argue that the State was responsible for causing the suffering she was facing, but 
instead based her argument on State’s positive obligations. She argued that State’s had, according 
to the case law, a positive obligation to protect its citizens from degrading treatment. The applicant 
claimed that her State was obliged to protect her from the suffering she was facing.208 
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The applicant argued that the State could not justify the blanket ban, which according to her 
violated her rights under article 3, because the rights under the article are absolute. A balance had 
been struck despite this, according to the applicant, and the individual facts of her case had not 
been taken into consideration when balancing the rights under article 3 against other rights.209 She 
argued that there should be an exception in the blanket ban for people like her, who were mentally 
capable and were not in the need of protection.210  
The Court agreed with the applicant about the absolute nature of article 3,211 but held that 
treatments listed under article 3 has mostly applied in situations where an individual has been at a 
risk of a State agent or a public authority intentionally inflicting that individual with such 
treatment.212 The Court also noted that a positive obligation under article 3 had been found in some 
cases.213 The Court held nevertheless that in the case in question it was clear that the State did not 
inflict any ill-treatment on the applicant, nor was it argued that the State failed to provide the 
applicant with appropriate medical care.214 The Court held that the applicant’s perception of a 
States obligations under article 3 “places a new and extended construction on the concept of 
treatment, which, as found by the House of Lords, goes beyond the ordinary meaning of the 
word”.215 The Court also noted that article 3 “must be construed in harmony with Article 2”.216 
The Court Stated that an obligation to terminate life cannot be derived from article 3, despite the 
Court being sympathetic for the distressing death the applicant was facing.217 The Court held that 
the State had not violated article 3 in the Convention.218 
Paul Tiensuu notes that in the Pretty case the applicant is clearly mentally competent, contrary the 
Keenan case, where the individual was suffering from schizophrenia219 and X v. Germany, where 
a prisoner went on a hunger strike.220 He argues that the Court therefore confirmed in the Pretty 
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case that even when an individual is evidently mentally competent article 2 can be raised against 
a complaint regarding quality of life based on article 3.221 
When assessing whether unbearable suffering (such as what the applicant in the Pretty case was 
facing if she was to die from the disease) can breach article 3, Jozef  Dorscheidt notes that support 
for such a view is hard to find in the case law of the ECtHR or the drafting history of the provision. 
He notes furthermore, based on the Court’s case law, that it is difficult to show that medical 
treatment has been intentionally used to cause intensive physical and mental suffering.222 A 
violation of article 3 has however been found for example by the Commission with regard to forced 
feeding and medication, as well as retainment of a patient to a bed in the case of Herczegfalvy v. 
Austria,223 but the Court disagreed.224 If it were established that a medical practitioner had 
intentionally caused such suffering, another question would have to be answered, namely whether 
they were acting as a private person or a State official. When considering the margin of 
appreciation that States enjoy in sensitive medical-ethical issues,225 in addition to the 
aforementioned factors, Dorscheidt concludes that it remains unlikely that a criminalization of 
assisted suicide or euthanasia would breach article 3, albeit it may depend on the facts of the 
case.226 
A scenario where Dorscheidt argues a breach of article 3 regarding end-of-life treatment may occur 
is if the medical professionals were to intentionally humiliate a severely suffering patient wishing 
to die227 or if the medical treatment in such a scenario were to be found to be genuinely 
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appalling.228 Dorscheidt argues however that if there is a risk of a breach of the right to life it would 
be illogical to allow the possibility of such a breach only to ensure that article 3 is not breached.229 
3.3. Autonomy and death with dignity 
The applicant in the Pretty case argued that the right to self-determination was guaranteed under 
article 8 in the Convention and that this right encompassed the right to decide about one’s own 
body. This included, according to the applicant, a right to decide when and how to die. Her rights 
under article 8 (1) had therefore according to her been interfered with.230 
The Court held that the term “private life” was not “susceptible to exhaustive definition” and that 
despite a right to self-determination not being established under article 8, personal autonomy is 
“an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees”.231 The Court noted that 
when the private conduct of an individual has been interfered with through compulsory or criminal 
measures, it has been considered to be an interference in that individuals private life within the 
meaning of article 8 (1), even when the conduct has been potentially harmful to that individual, or 
perhaps even when it is of life threatening nature. This type of interference requires therefore a 
justification according to the second paragraph of the article.232 The Court noted that rights under 
article 8 (1) may be engaged if a patient who refuses to take medicine is forced to take it against 
their own will, even in cases where the medicine would prolong the patient’s life.233  
The Court stated that human dignity and human freedom are the very essence of the Convention 
and that “[i]n an era of growing medical sophistication combined with longer life expectancies, 
many people are concerned that they should not be forced to linger on in old age or in states of 
advanced physical or mental decrepitude which conflict with strongly held ideas of self and 
personal identity.”234 The Court held that the applicant’s right to private life may have been 
interfered with, by stating that it “not prepared to exclude that this constitutes an interference with 
her right to respect for private life”.235 Grégor Puppinck and Claire de la Hougue argue that the 
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Court may have already “admitted” by this statement that the choice to die is within the scope of 
the article. They argue that if that is the case, States must be able to justify any restriction to the 
choice.236 
The Court decided to consider whether there was a justification in accordance with article 8 (2).237 
When assessing whether the prohibition on assisted suicide was justified under article 8 (2) the 
Court considered the margin of appreciation that States enjoy. It held that although the margin of 
appreciation had been found to be narrow regarding an individual’s sexual life, the Court held that 
the case in question was of different nature.238 The applicant argued that blanket ban on assisted 
suicide was disproportionate.239 The Court held that the applicant was not in the category of 
vulnerable that the domestic law was intended to protect but noted that as the state of terminally 
ill individuals varies, and some of them will fall under this category.240 It held that “[i]t is primarily 
for States to assess the risk and the likely incidence of abuse if the general prohibition on assisted 
suicides were relaxed or if exceptions were to be created”241 The Court found neither the blank 
prohibition on assisted suicide nor the refusal of the DPP to give an undertaking to be 
disproportionate.242 The Court held therefore that the interference was justified under article 8 (2) 
and article 8 was not breached.243 
Complaints regarding the United Kingdom laws on assisted suicide were again addressed by the 
Court in the inadmissibility decision of Nicklinson and Lamb v. the United Kingdom.244 The first 
applicant in the case was the late wife of Tony Nicklinson, a man who suffered from locked in 
syndrome.245 Mr. Nicklinson wished to end his life through suicide but was unable to do so himself. 
His only legal option under the domestic law was to starve himself to death. In 2007 he made a 
living will stating that he wishes for all treatment except for pain relief to be ended and no longer 
took any medication that would prolong his life. As such a death would be painful for his loved 
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ones to watch, he wished to be killed through an injection of a lethal drug, which was illegal.246 
After the High Court dismissed his claims that assistance in his suicide should be allowed legally, 
he started to refuse nutrition and hydration, as well as refusing medical treatment. He died in 
August 2012.247 The first applicant’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was unsuccessful,248 as well 
as her appeal to the Supreme Court.249 
The first applicant’s claims before the ECtHR was based on article 8. She claimed that both her 
and her late husband’s rights under article 8 had been breached, as she held that the domestic courts 
did not assess whether the domestic law was compatible with her rights under article 8.250 The 
Court held that the procedural protections of article 8 could not be extend to a State being obliged 
to examine the merits of a challenge of primary law.251 The Court held that as the Supreme Court 
held that the applicant had failed to show that developments after the Pretty case meant that the 
blanket ban was disproportionate, it had assessed the compatibility of the law in relation to article 
8.252 The Court found the application of the first applicant to be manifestly ill-founded.253 
The second applicant in the case was irreversibly paralyzed due to a car accident254 and wished to 
end his life as he could no longer enjoy it. Due to being almost fully paralyzed this would however 
require a lethal injection, in other words active voluntary euthanasia.255 The second applicant 
complained in front of the Court on the basis of articles 6, 8, 13 and 14, claiming that these articles 
were breached as the State did not provide the possibility for him to seek the authority of the court 
to allow a third person to give him a lethal injection.256 The second applicant’s application was 
however deemed as inadmissible before the Court as the applicant had failed to exhaust all 
domestic remedies.257 
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A case from 2011, Haas v. Switzerland,258 focused largely on article 8 regarding assisted suicide. 
The applicant in the case suffered from a serious bipolar affective disorder and had during his 20 
years of suffering from the disorder tried to commit suicide twice and had stayed in a psychiatric 
hospital several times.259 While euthanasia is prohibited in Switzerland, assisted suicide is legal.260 
However, article 15 of the Swiss Penal Code prohibits assisting someone in suicide if they do it 
for selfish reasons.261 There is an association in Switzerland called “Dignitas” which has as one of 
its objectives to assure death with dignity for its members.262 The applicant in the Haas case 
became a member of the association and asked the for assistance in his suicide.  He was denied 
several times the lethal substance that he asked for.263 
After several failed attempts of the applicant to obtain the lethal sustenance264 and after taking the 
matter to the domestic courts, which held that article 8 does not impose States with an obligation 
to provide the applicant with the lethal substance he asked for,265 the applicant took the matter to 
the ECtHR. The applicant complained about the conditions required to obtain the lethal 
subsidence, basing his complaint on article 8. He claimed that he had a right under the article to 
choose the time and manner of his death and that the State is obliged to provide a person in a 
situation such as his with the medical products required to commit suicide.266  
The Court considered that deciding how and when to die is an aspect of the right to private life 
within the meaning of article 8, with the condition that the individual can freely come to the 
decision.267 The Court noted that the case in question differed from the Pretty case in a few ways. 
The applicant in the case was not terminally ill, he was not unable to commit suicide due to his 
condition and he alleged that the State was obliged to provide him with a lethal sustenance in order 
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to avoid an undignified suicide, as opposed to the Pretty case that concerned the freedom to die.268 
The Court decided to examine the case “from the perspective of a positive obligation on the State 
to take the necessary measures to permit a dignified suicide”.269 
The Court noted again that as the Convention must be interpreted as a whole, the obligation to 
protect the lives of the vulnerable under article 2 must be considered. The authorities of a State 
must protect the vulnerable from actions that threaten their lives, even when they are at the risk of 
taking their own life. The decision to commit suicide must be taken “freely and with full 
understanding of what is involved”.270 
The Court held that States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation regarding end of life decisions, as 
there is no consensus among European countries regarding the issue.271 The Court held that Swiss 
authorities had a legitimate aim to restrict the availability of lethal substances to patients with 
prescriptions, namely, to protect individuals from hasty decisions and to prevent abuse. The aim 
was also ensuring that only mentally capable individuals could obtain lethal doses of such 
substances.272 The Court found such restrictions to be especially important in States that do allow 
assisted suicide in order to prevent abuse.273 It held that the law in Switzerland that required a 
prescription in order to obtain a lethal dose of a substance functioned as a way to ensure that the 
decision is taken with free will.274 The Court concluded by stating that “even assuming that the 
States have a positive obligation to adopt measures to facilitate the act of suicide with dignity, the 
Swiss authorities have not failed to comply with this obligation in the instant case.”275 
As Rietiker mentions, the Haas case differs from the Pretty case in a considerable way, as the case 
concerned a State’s possible positive obligation to facilitate suicide, rather than a negative 
obligation to abstain from interference with a right, as was the case in Pretty.276 He criticized the 
Court’s vague, and perhaps even contradictory language regarding the possible obligation to in 
certain situations facilitate suicide. On the one hand the Court seems to indicate that such an 
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obligation exists by stating that it “considers that it is appropriate to examine the applicant’s 
request to obtain access to sodium pentobarbital without a medical prescription from the 
perspective of a positive obligation on the State to take the necessary measures to permit a dignified 
suicide”277 while on the other hand it held that “even assuming that the States have a positive 
obligation to adopt measures to facilitate the act of suicide with dignity […]”,278 thereby leaving 
the question open.279 Rietker identifies a few positive aspects in the Haas case. The case is the first 
one to confirm that article 8 protects the right to choose how and when to die. The Court also 
established in the case that a requirement of an expert opinion in order to access a lethal substance 
is a suitable procedure to be taken to prevent abuse in a State where assisted suicide is authorized. 
He also held that the case was examined by the Court to a great extent without bypassing the claims 
made by the applicant.280 
Although the Court did not confirm a positive obligation to facilitate suicide in the Haas case, it 
has been argued that the case recognizes the right for an individual to end their own life.281 As 
rights under article 8 are not absolute, and these rights can be restricted if the restrictions comply 
with article 8 (2), also the right to choose how and when to die can be restricted. As Wicks notes, 
arguing for the legalization of assisted suicide can be problematic, as the rights of others in the 
society need to be considered. She emphasizes the need to protect the vulnerable by stating that 
“the danger that vulnerable persons, especially the elderly or those suffering from a terminal 
illness, might be bullied into ending their lives provides a restraint upon the law’s ability to protect 
autonomous choices to die in this context”.282 The issue concerning the protection of vulnerable 
individuals will be discussed further below.283 
Negri argues that due to the margin of appreciation that States enjoy regarding assisted suicide, 
the Court implied in the Haas case that the Swiss law was indeed compatible with the 
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Convention.284 She also interpreted the Courts decision in the case to mean that States have no 
positive obligation to ensure that individuals can die with dignity.285 An opposing view has 
however also been proposed. Puppinck and de la Hougue argue that the Haas case shows a 
development from a liberty to a right regarding assisted suicide.286 They note that the Court moved 
away from its original wording used in the Pretty case, namely that that suicide rather than natural 
death is an exercise of choice,287 to referring to “right to decide by what means and at what point 
his or her life will end” in the Haas case.288 G R Sullivan argues that the Haas case recognized a 
right to die under article 8 (1),289 but that it is not an unqualified right, since it is restricted to those 
who are free to make the choice.290 
Black calls the judgement in the Haas case a “hesitant recognition […] of a positive obligation on 
the State to adopt measures facilitating ‘dignified’ suicide”.291 She argues that States that have 
blanket prohibitions on assisted suicide will struggle more justifying such a position compared to  
States like Switzerland that allow assisted suicide, as it will be more difficult to show that such a 
prohibition is proportionate to a legitimate aim under article 8 (2). She holds justifications of a 
blanket prohibitions such as the one in England to be at first glance difficult to justify, as she deems 
it to contradict the principle that rights must be practical and effective, which has been established 
in the ECtHR’s case law.292 Nonetheless, as she explains, due to the wide margin of appreciation 
that States enjoy regarding end-of-life situations such a blanket prohibition may be justified.293 
However, Black seems somewhat convinced of the existence of a positive obligation to facilitate 
suicide, as she analyses whether the law in the United Kingdom can comply with the obligation.294 
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The right to choose how and when to die in the Haas case has been argued based on the case to 
extend to individuals suffering from psychiatric disabilities.295  
When analysing the Swiss law on assisted suicide after the Haas case, Black notes that clarifying 
that assisted suicide is authorized also for individuals with psychiatric disorders, rather than solely 
for individuals who are terminally ill or whose suffering is of somatic nature, clarifies for 
physicians the boundaries of legal assisted suicide. This may be beneficial for physicians as they 
can act with more certainty when prescribing lethal substances, but according to Black it may not 
benefit the individuals seeking assisted suicide. Patients suffering from psychiatric disabilities in 
Switzerland still have it more difficult when it comes to receiving a prescription for a lethal 
substance. Black speculates that the requirements imposed on individuals suffering from 
psychiatric disorders are placed because it is harder to recognize suffering originating form a non-
somatic source.296 
The following year of the Haas case there was another end of life case where the applicant relied 
on article 8 in the Convention, namely the case of Koch v. Germany.297 In this case the applicant 
was not an individual wanting to commit suicide, but rather the husband of a late wife. His late 
wife had fallen in front of her doorstep and was almost completely paralyzed due to it. She required 
artificial ventilation and constant care and suffered from spasms. She was expected to live at least 
15 more years. She wished to commit suicide with the help of her husband as she did not want to 
live a life that she felt was undignified.298 She tried to obtain a prescription to a lethal dose of a 
substance in order to commit suicide at home but was refused it based on the domestic law in 
Germany, which criminalized assisted suicide.299 
The applicant and his late wife took the matter to the Federal Court in Germany, which held that 
due to article 2 in the Convention a State cannot have an obligation to assist someone in committing 
suicide.300 The applicant’s late wife committed suicide with the help of Dignitas in Switzerland in 
February 2005,301 after which the applicant continued lodging complaints to the domestic courts 
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without success.302 The Cologne Administrative Court declared the applicant’s complaint as 
inadmissible, as it held that the applicant could not claim that his own rights had been violated.303 
The North-Rhine Westphalia Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s request for 
appeal and the Federal Constitutional Court also found declared his complaints inadmissible.304 
The applicant based his arguments in front of the ECtHR on article 8 in the Convention, that is to 
say that his rights had been breached.305 He based the claims on that he had a personal interest that 
his wife’s wish be respected, and that the refusal of the authorities to authorize her assisted suicide 
“had immediate repercussions on his own state of health.”306 Similarly to previous assisted suicide 
cases, the applicant claimed that article 8 contained the right to choose how and when to die.307 
The Court held that the case in question had to be differentiated from cases where an individual is 
complaining on behalf of a diseased individual, as in this case the applicant claimed that his own 
rights had been breached.308 The Court held that the applicant had an exceptionally close 
relationship to the diseased person and that he could claim to have been directly affected by the 
refusal for authorities to authorize his late wife’s assisted suicide.309 The Court noted that even if 
a substantive right under the Convention had not yet been established, it may still be possible for 
a right to judicial review to exists under article 8.310 Considering these factors and previous case 
law regarding assisted dying, the Court held that the applicant’s right to respect for private life 
under article 8 (1) had been interfered with, as the domestic courts had refused to examine the 
merits in the case.311 As the Court examined whether the interference could be justified under 
article 8 (2), it held that the applicant’s procedural rights had been breached, as it did not find that 
the State was justified not to examine the merits in his case.312 The Court decided not to rule on 
the merits of the claims due to the principle of subsidiarity.313 
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The finding that the husband could be a victim of a violation in this situation differed completely 
from the previously established concept of a victim. Puppinck and de La Hougue question the 
Courts decision, as they note that the Court did not clarify how the applicant’s rights were involved.  
As they note, it is easy to see how his feelings were involved, but it is more challenging to 
determine how his rights were involved. They propose two possibilities as to how his rights could 
have been involved; either through a right to his wife’s death or that he has a right that concerns 
the conditions of her death.314 They criticize the Court for perhaps not considering the issue of the 
victim status from a strict legal rationality viewpoint, but rather from the viewpoint of the 
applicant’s feelings.  A third option they propose to the establishing of the applicant’s victim status 
is that as the assistant in the suicide “both provides the means by which the individual desiring 
suicide can actualise their right to take their life while also benefitting from the personal right of 
the suicidal person”.315 
Gross v. Switzerland316 was a case that was declared inadmissible after it came to the knowledge 
of the Court that the applicant had already committed suicide before the Chamber had adopted its 
decision on the case.317 The case concerned an elderly woman who wished to end her life as her 
physical and mental faculties declined with time.318 She was denied a prescription to a lethal 
sustenance in order to commit suicide and claimed that this breached her right under article 8 in 
the Convention to decide by what means and when she would die.319 In May 2013 the Chamber 
delivered a judgement in which it held that there had been a violation of article 8, but at that time 
the Court was not aware of the fact that the applicant was already dead.320 In that judgement the 
Swiss law was found to be in breach of article 8 because it was found not to be sufficiently clear 
as it did not give clear guidelines on under which circumstances someone should be able to obtain 
a lethal dose of a substance in order to commit suicide.321 Much like in previous case-law, the 
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Court only assessed the case through procedural standards, while not ruling on the substantive 
issues.322 
Tiensuu argues that the judgement in Gross indicates that States can have a positive obligation 
under article 8 to specify when citizens are free from prosecution when assisting someone in 
committing suicide and to assure that citizens are not denied assistance in suicide because of a 
groundless fear of criminal charges.323 He argues that in cases where States do accept assisted 
suicide, it has to be clear when such assistance is accepted.324 
Dorscheidt proposes, based on the case law of the ECtHR in end-of-life situations, that the relevant 
question has moved from being the question about the legal status of the freedom to choose to end 
one’s life to being what the limitations of such as right can be.325 However, as Rainey et al note, 
when examining the case law relating to assisted suicide and active euthanasia, the Court remains 
rather silent on the substantive standards, and is more willing to address the procedural standards. 
Rainey et al argue that it is clear that seeking to die with dignity through suicide does fall within 
the protection of article 8, but they are not convinced that the article yet encompasses a right to a 
specific means of death. This is because of conflicting obligations under article 2 and the wide 
margin of appreciation that States enjoy on the subject.326  
Puppinck and de la Hougue argue that the Court’s establishment of violations of procedural rights 
relating to assisted suicide suggests that substantive rights relating to assisted suicide exist. They 
base their argument on the inherent nature of a procedural obligation, as an “accessory to the 
principal material right”.327 In other words, in order to have a procedural obligation, a material 
obligation must exist first. This can be an autonomous conventional obligation or a material 
obligation in the domestic law that falls within the scope of the Convention. A third, and most 
common situation, is that it is both.328 They base their analysis on the procedural rights that the 
Court has developed in relation to assisted suicide on the Haas case, the Koch case and the Gross 
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case.329 It is notable that when the article was published the Gross case had not yet been deemed 
inadmissible.330  
When assessing whether the underlying substantial right to assisted suicide is an independent 
conventional right or not, Pupponck and de la Houge note that while in the Haas case (and the 
Gross case) the domestic law authorized assisted suicide in some cases, while in the Koch case it 
was criminalized. They reason that in situations such as the Koch case, where the domestic law 
prohibits assisted suicide the substantive right that is behind the procedural right could be argued 
to be an independent conventional right and therefore binding to all member States.331 The Court 
did not conclude that in the Koch case, however.332 
Puppinck and de la Hougue note that the Court has not in its case law regarding assisted dying 
dismissed the possible existence of an independent conventional right to assisted dying. They 
criticize the Court’s statement however in the Koch case that article 8 “may encompass a right to 
judicial review even in a case in which the substantive right in question had yet to be 
established”.333 This statement was made based on a previous case where the right to substantive 
right already existed in the domestic law,334 therefore differing from the Koch case where the 
substantive right did not exist in domestic law. Consequently, they hold this argument to be 
insufficient.335 They argue that “the legal basis on which the court is building a right to assisted 
suicide is dubious”.336 
Puppnck and de la Hougue note that while assisted suicide is a clear attack on life, the Court has 
in its case law increasingly disregarded article 2, along with article 17, which prohibits the abuse 
of rights under the Convention. They argue that a conventional right to assisted suicide and 
euthanasia should not be possible due to article 17 and yet the Court has established that article 8 
encompasses a right to decide how and when to die. The way they interpret the judgement of the 
Court in the Haas case, is that in cases where a State allows assisted suicide or euthanasia article 
2 only places positive procedural obligations on the State to ensure that the suicide is autonomous. 
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Therefore, they interpret autonomy to be the source and the condition of the right to suicide. They 
argue based on the Haas case that autonomy has replaced the right to life in hierarchy as the 
highest-ranking human right.337  
In the Koch case and the Gross case, the Court does not mention article 2 in its judgement. The 
statement by the Court that “[w]ithout in any way negating the principle of sanctity of life protected 
under the Convention, the Court considers that it is under Article 8 that notions of the quality of 
life take on significance”, which was first stated in the Pretty case,338 was again stated in the 
Koch339 case and in the Gross case.340 Puppnck and de la Hougue interpret this as the Court moving 
away from an objective right to life and putting more value on the quality of life instead, which is 
more of a subjective conception.341 
3.4. Assisted suicide as a belief 
As noted by Wicks, little attention has been given to the potential applicability of article 9 in end-
of-life cases.342 So far rights under article 9 have only been assessed by the ECtHR in one case of 
assisted suicide/active euthanasia.343 The applicant in the Pretty case claimed that her rights under 
article 9 in the Convention had been violated because she believed in the notion of assisted 
suicide.344 The Court assessed the claims in the case under article 9 shortly, stating that “not all 
opinions or convictions constitute beliefs in the sense protected by Article 9 § 1 of the 
Convention”345 and that “[h]er claims do not involve a form of manifestation of a religion or belief, 
through worship, teaching, practice or observance[…]”346 The Court found no violation of article 
9.347 Since the Pretty case article 9 has not been invoked in other cases regarding assisted dying. 
Despite the ECtHR holding that there was no violation of article 9 in the Pretty case, Wicks has 
analysed whether the article might still be relevant in assisted suicide in her thesis Dying with 
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Conscience: The Potential Application of Article 9 ECHR to Assisted Dying.348 In the thesis she 
argues that the Court has changed its approach on what constitutes a manifestation of a belief.349 
She notes that the scope of article 9 reaches beyond simply the right not to hold religious beliefs, 
as it has been shown to encompass the right to hold some specific secular beliefs such as 
pacifism.350  
Mark Campbell presents some reasons why article 9 (1) may not be deemed to be engaged. One 
of them is if the belief is not genuinely held. Another one is if the belief is not one that qualifies 
under the article, as not all beliefs do. Also, even if article 9 (1) protects the belief in questions, 
the expression of such a belief may be justly restricted.351 In the case of Eweida and Others v. the 
United Kingdom,352 the Court held that the rights under article 9 encompass “views that attain a 
certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance”.353 Wicks notes that these 
standards may be easier met by some beliefs compared to others, taking beliefs form mainstream 
religion as an example of beliefs that may pass the test easier. She also acknowledges that well-
established schools of thought outside of religion may pass the test rather easily, as opposed to a 
single-issue belief.354 In X v Federal Republic of Germany355 the applicant did not want to be 
buried in a cemetery with Christian symbols after he dies but preferred instead to be buried on his 
own land. The Commission held that the applicant’s wish could not be “considered as a 
manifestation of his belief by a ’practice’”.356 Wicks argues that the standard set out by the 
Commission for the term “belief” “arguably presupposes a quasi-religious approach to belief 
systems”,357 as the Commission  stated that the applicant’s wish in the case  was not  a 
“manifestation of any belief in the sense that some coherent view on fundamental problems can be 
seen as being expressed thereby”.358  
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According to Wicks, a personal belief may be more likely to fall within the scope of article 9 if 
there is a “formation of an association which will imply a level of formality”.359 She also argues 
that non-religious beliefs are at a disadvantage compared to religious beliefs when it comes to 
assessing whether they amount to a belief within the scope of article 9. According to her, this is 
because “establishing that a belief is sufficiently serious and presents a coherent view on 
fundamental problems is a much harder task in the absence of a widely respected body of opinion 
which presents an agreed solution to transcendental issues”.360 
As is stated in article 9 in the Convention, manifestation of a belief can be in the form of “worship, 
teaching, practice and observance”.361 Wicks argues that non-religious beliefs are again at a 
disadvantage, as the display of non-religious beliefs may resemble more social or political 
action.362 She argues however that the Court has taken a new approach in its requirements 
regarding a manifestation of a belief and focuses largely on the Eweida case to demonstrate this.363 
Two of the applicants in the case claimed that their rights to manifest their beliefs had been 
breached as their employers did not allow them to visibly wear a cross necklace.364 Wicks argues 
that the Court adapted a broad approach on manifestation of belief,365 as the Court stated that: 
In order to count as a “manifestation” within the meaning of Article 9, the act in question must be intimately 
linked to the religion or belief. An example would be an act of worship or devotion which forms part of the 
practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognised form. However, the manifestation of religion or belief 
is not limited to such acts; the existence of a sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the 
underlying belief must be determined on the facts of each case. In particular, there is no requirement on the 
applicant to establish that he or she acted in fulfilment of a duty mandated by the religion in question.366 
As Wicks notes, this broader interpretation means that a manifestation within the meaning of 
article 9 does not need to be considered as appropriate by a specific religion or belief, but rather 
has to be assessed in context and the act must be sufficiently closely linked to the belief.367 This 
development might make it possible for article 9 to be relevant in assisted dying according to 
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Wicks, but even if assisted dying constituted a belief under article 9, the possibility of a 
restriction on such a belief being justified under article 9(2) still exists.368  
The challenge with engaging article 9 in cases of assisted dying is the disadvantage of non-
religious beliefs according to Wicks,369 despite her believing that the wish of dying with dignity 
satisfies most of the requirements set out by the Court in the Eweida case.370 The challenging 
part is the question of whether wanting to die with dignity “presents a coherent and cogent view 
on the fundamental problem of dying”.371 There is no consensus on assisted dying being the 
most dignified way to hasten death as opposed to palliative care.372  
Wicks argues that after the Eweida case, the most significant difficulty would likely not be to 
find a close link between dying with dignity and a manifestation of the belief, but rather 
elevating it to a belief within the meaning of article 9.373 Elevating an individualistic belief in 
dying with dignity to what would be considered a belief under article 9 remains unlikely, 
according to Wicks, due to the difficulties she presented in her paper.374 
There is a limited exception to legal obligations based on conscience that has been recognized 
in the case law of the ECtHR.375 Wicks therefore considers the possibility of assisted dying 
being protected under article 9 through a conscientious objection as well.376 In Bayatyan v. 
Armenia377 the Court held that article 9 was applicable, despite the article not specifically 
referring to a right to conscientious objection, as the applicant was a Jehovah’s Witness and 
was objecting to military service due to his religion.378  The Court found that there had been an 
interference in the applicant’s rights under article 9 and that they were not justified under article 
9 (2).379 Wicks argues that despite the applicant in the case relying on a mainstream religion as 
a reason to conscientious objection, the reasoning should withstand without it. Dying with 
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dignity may meet the standards set out in the case,380 namely that a prohibition of assisted dying 
is in “serious and insurmountable conflict” with a “person’s conscience or his deeply and 
genuinely held religious or other beliefs”.381  
Another view has been presented by James E. Hurford, who suggests that conscious objections 
to military service is an exception and would not be applicable regarding other issues. He argues 
that if a general obligation is applied neutrally it is unlikely to breach article 9. His interpretation 
of article 9 is that it does not appear to entail a duty on States to provide a general exemption 
from legal duties through conscientious objections. He interprets military service as being 
merely an exception.382  
Although Hurford is not convinced that there is a general right to conscientious objection, based 
on the partly dissenting opinion of judges Vučinić and Gaetano in the Eweida case, he 
hypothesizes the possibility that if a genuinely held objection entails sufficient “cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance”383 rights under article 9 may have been interfered with. 
The partly dissenting judges used the following definition of conscience: 
Conscience – by which is meant moral conscience – is what enjoins a person at the appropriate moment to do 
good and to avoid evil. In essence it is a judgment of reason whereby a physical person recognises the moral 
quality of a concrete act that he is going to perform, is in the process of performing, or has already completed. 
This rational judgment on what is good and what is evil, although it may be nurtured by religious beliefs, is 
not necessarily so, and people with no particular religious beliefs or affiliations make such judgments 
constantly in their daily lives.384 
 
The partly dissenting opinion in the case was that prescriptions of conscience must be separated 
from religious prescriptions, such as not eating certain foods or wearing religious clothing. 
According to the partly dissenting judges, the former cannot be justified under article 9 (2) 
while the latter can. They held that when there is a genuine and serious conscientious objection, 
a State has both positive and negative obligations to respect it based on the freedom of 
conscience.385 Hurford argues that manifesting conscience is fundamentally different from 
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manifesting belief. When manifesting conscience, one must act on what he calls “inward 
perceived and held moral and ethical precepts”, while manifesting belief is about “outward 
obligations” that a person follows due to their beliefs. Hurford holds that there ought to be a 
difference between restrictions imposed on how one presents one’s beliefs and obliging an 
individual to act in contrast with their conscience.386 
Furthermore, if such an interference on the right under article 9 cannot be justified under the 
second provision of the article, a State may be obliged to allow individuals to object to an act 
if it violates their fundamentally held values. He also notes that even if the dissenting opinion 
is not correct, an argument for a conscientious objection could be made based on article 14 in 
conjunction with article 9, and that a breach of the Convention may be found that way.387  
Wicks argues that applying conscious objections to prohibitions of assisted dying would allow 
States to abide by the positive obligations of States to protect the right to life and to respect the 
principle of the sanctity of life, while still allowing an exemption for a minority whose 
conscience does not oppose to an “unnatural” death. She furthermore suggests that this might 
even be a preferable option to arguing for the right to assisted suicide through rights under 
article 8 in the Convention. Her reasoning is that arguments based on autonomy under article 8 
may open doors to anyone who decides to die through assisted dying, while “Article 9 would 
only protect those whose conscience genuinely requires a limited exemption from the usual 
legal rules”.388 She goes on to explain her reasoning by stating that: 
 In western societies where the generally applicable law is frequently founded upon, and 
sometimes still developed upon, Judaeo-Christian values, a limited exemption for those 
whose belief systems have different priorities (human dignity over sanctity of life, for 
example) could serve a vital role in ensuring that we can all live freely, guided by our 
own consciences in relation to the dying process.389 
Article 9 has also been used as an argument to support the notion that medical practitioners 
have a right to assist individuals in committing suicide. After all, when it comes to States 
where assisted suicide is criminalized it is the person who assists in the suicide who suffers 
the consequences of the criminalization.390 John Adenitire presents arguments for why such 
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a right may exist based on article 9, despite the Court finding no violation of article 9 in the 
Pretty case. In the Pretty case, the applicant stated that she “believed in and supported the 
notion of assisted suicide for herself”.391 Adenitire therefore argues that she presented her 
argument relying on autonomy rather than a value of conscience. He argues that this is less 
likely to be an issue when it comes to a medical practitioner. It is hardly for the practitioner’s 
autonomy or personal benefit that they choose to aid someone in committing suicide. 
Adenitire finds it convincing that a medical practitioner may be acting on what they deem 
to be a moral obligation in certain circumstances to help someone who requests it commit 
suicide. He believes if such a medical practitioner, who is acting out of sympathy, were to 
invoke article 9 with a different outcome than in the Pretty case.392  
Another argument Adenitire presents is that a medical practitioner could, based on a 
conscientious objection, invoke article 9, as he argues it is possible that it meets the 
requirements in the Bayatyan case. The medical practitioner feels that he must help the 
patient wishing to die. He must choose to act either on his conscience or the law. The conflict 
is serious as he may be criminally sanctioned if he acts on his conscience. Adenitire believes 
many medical practitioners would be able to show that the belief is cogent, serious, coherent 
and important.393 
Adenitire emphasizes that conscientious objections need not be refusals to do something. He 
bases the argument on the wording in article 9, as the article protects the right “to manifest 
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance”394 and that the article 
protects positive acts as well as negative ones. He argues that this is clear from the Eweida 
case.395 
When it comes to the protection of the vulnerable as a justification under article 9, Adenitire 
uses the arguments made by the court in a Canadian case, Carter v. Canada.396 To 
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summarize the arguments he presented from the Canadian case for why a blanket prohibition 
on assisted dying is not necessary: 
1. Doctors can asses the legitimacy of a request of assisted dying and that they can use 
already existing investigations related to other end-of-life medical decisions397 
2. Risks related to a permissive assisted dying law can be controlled “through a 
carefully designed and monitored system of safeguard”398 
3. “A theoretical or speculative fear cannot justify an absolute prohibition”399 
4. It should not be assumed that regulatory framework or criminal sanctions will 
function defectively and that a slippery slope into involuntary euthanasia will occur 
as a result400 
One last question to address regarding conscientious objections is the potential conscientious 
objection against assisted dying by medical practitioners. The Court has rejected claims 
regarding conscientious objections for example in the case of Pichon and Sajous v. 
France,401 where two pharmacists refused to sell contraceptives to three women. The 
pharmacists complained in front of the Court that they had a right to refuse selling the 
contraceptives based on article 9. The Court however held that since contraceptives were 
legal and were only sold in pharmacies “the applicants cannot give precedence to their 
religious beliefs and impose them on others as justification for their refusal to sell such 
products, since they can manifest those beliefs in many ways outside the professional 
sphere.”402 As Campbell notes, based on this case it may seem like conscientious objections 
within healthcare are simply not protected by article 9. This is, however, not necessarily the 
case, as Campbell notes that it was an inadmissibility decision that lacked any in depth 
reasoning by the Court. It may be the case that the conscientious objection in the case did 
not amount to a manifestation of the belief they had. He furthermore emphasizes the factual 
context in the case. The pharmacists had acted in contradiction to a criminal law.  Lastly, he 
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emphasizes the wide margin of appreciation regarding restrictions of article 9 that States 
generally enjoy.403  
3.5. An exception to a blanket prohibition of assisted suicide for physically disabled people? 
3.5.1. The slippery slope and the risk of abuse 
An argument used against the authorization of euthanasia is the slippery slope argument. Slippery 
slope arguments entail that if a specific action is authorized, then it will lead to something else 
which is morally wrong being authorized too. In the case of euthanasia this would mean moving 
from a restrictive authorization of voluntary euthanasia to a more permissive authorization of 
euthanasia. To support such an argument, one could take the Netherlands as an example. The law 
in the Netherlands has moved from allowing euthanasia and assisted suicide exclusively for the 
terminally ill, to authorizing assisted dying for others too, including the chronically ill, those 
suffering from psychological pain and incompetent patients.404 Another slippery slope argument 
against the authorization of euthanasia is moving from active voluntary euthanasia as practised 
solely in cases of immense suffering in terminally ill patients, to accepting the practice in less 
severe cases of suffering as well.405  Even if opponents of assisted dying may sometimes accept 
that there are cases in which assisted dying would be acceptable, they might still oppose the 
authorization of assisted dying in order to prevent the unintended deaths from happening.406 
3.5.2. Blanket ban of assisted dying as discrimination 
Article 14 was invoked by the applicant in the Pretty case407 and the Court decided to review the 
claim as it had found rights under article 8 to be engaged in the case.408 The fact that article 8 was 
not shown to have been violated does not exclude a possible breach of article 14 in conjunction 
with article 8, since the article was shown to be engaged.409 As mentioned earlier, the Court has 
noted that treating individuals who are in similar situations differently can be discriminatory under 
certain conditions,410 but it has equally noted that when States treat individuals who are in vastly 
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different situations similarly, and no objective and reasonable justification can be found for the 
similar treatment, the prohibition of discrimination is violated. 411  
In the argument of the applicant it was stated that the applicant was “prevented from exercising a 
right enjoyed by others”.412 Antje Pedain criticizes Mrs. Pretty’s counsel’s choice to use the term 
right instead of a liberty to commit suicide when talking about the discrimination of disabled 
people.413 The government responded to the applicants claims under article 14 by stating that no 
discrimination has occurred as under the domestic law no one can be said to have a right to commit 
suicide.414 The government also referenced the arguments it made regarding article 3 and 8, namely 
that allowing disabled people an exception to the blanket prohibition of assisted suicide would risk 
abuse and eventually lead to the practice of involuntary euthanasia. They also argued that it fell 
within the margin of appreciation of the State.415 The Court addressed the argument under the 
article briefly. It agreed with the government. The Court held that there were sound reasons for 
not allowing exceptions to the blanket prohibition, as this would introduce a risk of abuse.416 No 
violation was found of article 14.417  
According to Pedain a separate justification for treating disabled individuals the same as able-
bodied individuals under article 14 is necessary, as a law that results in disabled individuals not 
being able to commit suicide contrary to able-bodied individuals, causes discriminatory treatment 
of disabled people. But as she notes, although a prohibition that leads to inequality in that it affects 
a particular group of individuals harsher than others seems to be discriminatory at first glance, a 
decisive answer on whether the law is in fact discriminatory requires a look into whether the burden 
on the group is placed arbitrarily.418 In the Pretty case the Court held that there was a legitimate 
aim for prohibiting assisted suicide from all individuals, as it held it to be necessary in order to 
prevent abuse and to protect the vulnerable.419 As noted by Pedain, the argument that it is necessary 
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to prohibit assisted suicide altogether, even if it come at the price that individuals such as Mrs. 
Pretty have to pay, is a kind of slippery slope argument.420 
Pedain criticizes the decision made by the Court regarding article 14. According to her the heavier 
burden placed on disabled people under the domestic law was not justified.421 After examining the 
Pretty case under articles 8 and 14, she argues that according to the law, non-vulnerable, mentally 
competent individuals who are physically unable to commit suicide will have to be given an 
exception from blanket prohibitions. The condition she puts forward for such an exception is that 
such a law would still effectively protect the vulnerable. She is not convinced that such a law is 
impossible to legislate and criticizes the lack of examination of such a possibility by the Court.422 
She holds that exceptions to a blanket ban on assisted suicide are possible without risking abuse, 
as a similar practice already exists with regard to refusal of medical treatment which can in some 
cases lead to death.  She suggests that by requiring courts and doctors to assure that the patient is 
physically incapable of committing suicide, the exception to the law would not threaten the 
protection of the vulnerable and able-bodied individuals in general. This would according to her 
also keep the authorization of euthanasia from moving towards a more permissive law which 
would eventually allow euthanasia for others as well.423 
Pedain addresses another concern too, namely the threat of moral corruption in society by making 
life appear as less valuable and more disposable.  In her view this is not the message the exception 
to a blanket prohibition of assisted suicide would send, as this exception would be based on the 
principle of personal autonomy and human dignity. She argues that it would coincide with our 
commitment to treat people equally in the absence of a compelling reason to do otherwise. In 
reference to Mrs. Pretty she states that “[t]he reason why we respect her choice remains the same 
reason that makes us respect the choice of able-bodied persons to commit suicide: not that it is the 
right choice, but that it is her choice.”424  
The argument that allowing assisted dying is risky as it can lead to a lack of protection of the 
vulnerable is a common argument used against authorization of assisted dying, despite the fact that 
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evidence of it occurring in States that allow it has been argued to be weak.425 Similar comments 
have been made by Tiensuu as was made by Pedain. He notes that the argument that a blanket ban 
on assisted suicide is necessary in order to protect the vulnerable is inherently a slippery slope 
argument.426 He is not convinced by this argument. He takes another approach than Pedain, 
however. He compares assisted suicide to palliative care, which is often proposed as a better 
option, albeit it is less controlled and reported compared to assisted suicide. Consent is not an issue 
in assisted suicide according to him, whereas that is not the case for palliative care, which he argues 
leads to unrequested deaths.427 The side effect of death that is accepted in palliative care is 
commonly called “the doctrine of double effect”. It entails that when a disease progresses, doctors 
may administer potentially lethal quantities of a drug such as diamorphine or morphine into a 
patient in order to relieve pain. The idea behind it is that the doctor’s action is not motivated by 
the potential negative effect of the drug, death, but is instead motivated by the positive effects of 
it, which is relieving pain. A doctor administering such doses of a drug is therefore according to 
the doctrine not guilty of murder. Interestingly, many countries that do not authorize assisted 
suicide or euthanasia still authorize palliative care.428 Death is not the intended outcome in 
palliative care, however, as injecting a patient with potentially lethal doses of a drug must happen 
only in a situation where the risk of death is deemed to be justified in a terminally ill patient as the 
pain relief it provides is perceived to outweigh the benefit of continued life.429 
Tiensuu presents two different slippery slope arguments, the first one being that allowing voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide would lead to cases of involuntary euthanasia and the second one 
being that allowing these two forms of assisted dying for terminally ill patients would lead to cases 
of assisted suicide of individuals experiencing nonphysical suffering.430 He is unconvinced of both 
arguments. Regarding the first type of slippery slope, he argues that the argument requires support 
by empirical studies, which he claims is lacking. To the second type of slippery slope argument he 
replies by stating that if we accept the underlying principles of palliative care and refusal of LST, 
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namely beneficence and autonomy, it should be irrelevant whether the suffering is physical or 
not.431 
As Tiensuu indicates, those who choose palliative care at the end of their lives need not opt for 
assisted suicide instead, even when assisted suicide is available. These two forms of medical 
treatment can coexist. As he states, 
[a] trade-off of interests does not really take place between those who could be helped with palliative care and 
those who request assisted suicide, because palliative care could be given to those who do not want assisted 
suicide even if assisted suicide were also available. Rather, the trade-off is between those who could be bullied 
into unwillingly ending their lives and those who could seek assisted suicide to end their lives with more dignity 
and less pain432  
Tiensuu observes that what is at stake is two principles that are in contradiction, namely the right 
to life and the right to autonomy. He makes the interesting observation that when it comes to 
withholding LST, the prohibition of intentional killing has not been argued to overrule the right to 
autonomy, despite the fact that similarly to assisted suicide it will lead to death.433 He also argues 
that the act of assisting someone in suicide is no more motivated by desire to kill than is killing 
someone in self-defence or when it is required in a legal arrest,434 both of which are exceptions in 
accordance to article 2 (a) and 2 (b) in the Convention.435 He also emphasizes the fact that 
authorizing assisted suicide is not about a choice to end someone’s life, but rather about who is 
allowed to decide by what means and when the patient’s life will end. Palliative care contravenes 
the aim of preserving life and yet it is authorized. This leads Tiensuu to conclude, that what the 
right to life opposes is the patient being allowed to choose the time and manner of their death, 
which in turn is a right that individuals have under article 8.436 
Wicks has also considered that an exception to a blanket prohibition could be possible without 
risking the protection of the vulnerable. She argues that patients in situations such as Mrs. Pretty’s 
could be given an exception to a law that prohibits assisted suicide when the law overrides the 
patient’s personal autonomy. She suggests that an exception could be limited to situations where 
the patient’s suffering is unbearable, and the patient is unable to commit suicide by themselves.  
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She bases her argument on the principle of autonomy and quality of life considerations, which she 
argues pose a strong conflicting interest to States’ obligations to protect life.437 
Wicks argues that in addition to vulnerable individuals, there is another group of individuals that 
needs protection through law, namely the individuals who assist in suicides. She argues that since 
assisted suicide involves by definition at least two people, the protection of autonomy does not 
only concern the individual who wishes to die, but also the individual assisting in the suicide. Just 
as vulnerable individuals may be pressured into committing suicide, individuals may also be 
pressured into assisting someone in a suicide, which can lead to psychological harm. Wicks argues 
therefore that if assisted suicide is authorized it is important that the law includes a conscience 
clause to protect individuals who for religious reasons or otherwise do not want to participate in 
an assisted suicide.438 Such a provision exists for example in Belgium, where no one can according 
to the law be forced to perform or to assist in the performing of euthanasia.439 
3.6. Euthanasia and assisted suicide for minor patients 
When analysing the case-law of the ECtHR regarding assisted dying, it seems apparent that one of 
the most important criteria for authorizing different forms of assisted dying is the patient 
consenting to it as well as ensuring that the patient is mentally capable of making an informed 
decision on it. As seen above, different factors can play a role in whether a State is obliged to 
prevent an adult from committing suicide. But what if a child is terminally ill and is suffering to 
the extent that they wish to end their life rather than continuing to live? Can a child consent to 
assisted dying?  
Under Dutch law, euthanasia or assisted suicide is authorized for minors between the age of 12-16 
under certain conditions.440 In 2014 the act that authorized euthanasia in Belgium was amended, 
resulting in the age restriction of euthanasia to be removed. Consequently, euthanasia is legal for 
minors in Belgium now under certain conditions.441 Belgium is the first country in the world to 
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authorize euthanasia without an age limit.442 In both Belgium and the Netherlands one of the 
requirements for a legitimate consent to euthanasia or assisted suicide is that the minor understand 
the consequences of it.443 PACE stated its opinion in a written declaration in 2014 after the Belgian 
Senate voted for the legalization of euthanasia for children, that it held that the new law “betrays 
some of the most vulnerable children in Belgium by accepting that their lives may no longer have 
any inherent value or worth and that they should die”.444  
When it comes to assisted dying regarding minors, there may be different factors that have to be 
considered compared to assisted dying in adults. Luc Bovens has identified five common moral 
arguments against authorizing assisted dying to minors.445 One of the arguments he presents 
concerns what the ECtHR has emphasized extensively in its end-of-life case law, namely 
discernment. Bovens focuses his analysis on adolescents since he argues it is evident that young 
children lack discernment. He describes capacity of discernment and a valid decision in the context 
as responsive to reason and as being made by the agent themselves rather than giving the 
responsibility to someone else. Bovens argues that contrary to those who argue that adolescents 
lack discernment, he does not believe so. He argues that albeit the decision-making style of 
adolescents may differ from adults, this does not affect the capacity of discernment, as these 
differences can also be found between age groups among adults while the decision remains equally 
responsive to reason.446 
Another argument Bovens addresses is that adolescents lack discernment because of the influence 
from their parents, as their critical thinking skills have not yet developed fully. Bovens is not 
convinced by this argument either, as he argues that critical scrutiny is not required for an agent to 
have authorships over their decisions. He argues that if a minor opposes to euthanasia because of 
their parents’ view on euthanasia, this decision would be respected despite the lack of critical 
scrutiny. Therefore, Bovens argues that the same respect should be given to minors who request 
euthanasia because they grow up in a family that does not oppose euthanasia.447 
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A third argument Bovens presents is that the minor is being pressured into euthanasia. He argues 
that the pressure on a minor to request euthanasia is likely no bigger than the pressure older 
individuals may experience. In fact, he expects pressure on older individuals to be greater for 
multiple reasons, one of which is that parents often cling to their children’s lives harder than adults 
cling to their parents’ lives. 448 Another related argument he presents is that children are more 
sensitive to pressure when compared to adults and are therefore more vulnerable. While Bovens 
accepts that children may be more prone to succumb to pressure, he argues that it is still less likely 
that a child opts for euthanasia due to pressure because of the aforementioned reason, that is to 
say, that children are typically less pressured to request euthanasia. He also argues that parents 
typically feel obliged to make things well for their children, while the same may not be true to the 
same extent when it comes to adults taking care of their parents.449 The last argument he presents 
is that there is a better option, namely palliative case. He dismisses this argument by stating that 
this is an argument against euthanasia in general rather than an argument specifically against 
euthanasia for minors.450  The arguments made by Bovens have been criticized,451 but they give 
an idea on possible relevant questions regarding assisted dying in children.  
There have not yet been any cases brought to the ECtHR regarding active euthanasia or assisted 
suicide when it comes to minors.452 Therefore, the aforementioned concerns regarding minor 
patients’ capacity to consent to active euthanasia or assisted suicide have yet to be directly 
addressed by the Court. The possible outcome of such cases has been hypothesised, however. 
Dorscheidt seems to consider children as belonging to the group of vulnerable individuals, as based 
on the Court’s statements regarding the protection of the vulnerable in the Pretty case, he argues 
that it could potentially be justified for a State that allows assisted suicide to make restrictions of 
the practice on children.453 Passive euthanasia has been addressed by the Court regarding situations 
involving minors. Perhaps the case law on passive euthanasia on minors can also give some 
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indication to how the Court would address consent of minor patient in active euthanasia or assisted 
suicide. The issue of passive euthanasia on minor patients will be discussed in chapter 4.2.  
4. Passive Euthanasia under the ECHR 
4.1. The withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and the right to life 
As mentioned above,454 individuals who lack consciousness are protected by the right to life. While 
States have an obligation to take reasonable steps to preserve life, they are not obliged to provide 
an absolute right to receive medical treatment, including LST.455 When addressing the argument 
that individuals who are not conscious have less of a protection of the right to life, Wicks reminds 
that the view of separating persons from non-persons is both ethically and legally problematic. She 
emphasizes firstly that respect should be given to the previous wishes of the patient, as a way of 
respecting the interest of autonomy that individuals has. Secondly, she argues that autonomy is not 
the only interest that can apply to incapacitated individuals, as many interests and rights, such as 
human dignity, can still apply when the individual is not conscious. The issue of dignity can be 
complex with patients in a persistent vegetative state. On the one hand, it can be argued that 
withdrawing ANH leads to an undignified death, while on the other hand it can be argued that 
keeping such an individual alive with life prolonging treatment leads to an undignified life.456 
What is tricky about situations of patients in a vegetative state is that they cannot consent to 
treatment or alternatively refuse consent to treatment, as they do not, for obvious reasons, possess 
decision-making capacity at that moment. In this situation the question arises as to how the 
decision of the continuance/termination of LST must be made. There may be contradicting 
opinions between for example the family of the patient and the doctors treating the patient. One 
possible solution is that previous wishes of the patient are considered. These wishes can come in 
the form of a living will, which is made in advance by an individual who expresses their wishes as 
to what type of treatment they would like to receive/not to receive in the case that they lack decision 
making capacity at the point when such an information is needed. This is usually done in written 
form. Another alternative is the appointing of a healthcare power of attorney. This is a document 
where an individual appoints someone to make healthcare decisions for them in case they were to 
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lose decision making capacity.457 There is no consensus on the regulation of these advance 
directives in European countries458 and of course, not everybody makes an advance directive. 
Cases regarding withdrawal of LST has been brought in front of the ECtHR, including such cases 
where no advance directives were present. The Lambert case concerned the withdrawal of ANH 
from a man named Vincent Lambert.459 The applicants in the case were his parents as well as his 
half-brother and his sister.460 Vincent Lambert was in a chronic vegetative state after a car accident 
in 2008.461 At the time of the case Vincent Lambert was in Reims University Hospital where he 
received ANH.462 The Coma Science Group at the University of Liège concluded that Vincent 
Lambert was in a “chronic neuro-vegetative state characterized as ‘minimally conscious plus’”.463 
Vincent Lambert received several physiotherapy sessions and speech and language therapy 
sessions that were all unsuccessful.464  
Dr. Kariger, Vincent Lambert’s doctor, announced in January 2014, as a result of a meeting where 
five out of six doctors agreed on it, to withdraw the treatment.465 Dr. Kariger was convinced that 
continuing with the treatment would have been against the patient’s wishes.466 Vincent Lambert 
had not drawn any advance directives, however. Dr. Kariger’s conclusions on the patient’s wishes 
were based on wishes he had expressed to his wife and brother before the accident.467 
After the Conseil d’État declared that Dr. Kariger’s decision on withdrawing the treatment was 
lawful,468 the applicants complained to the ECHR, claiming that withdrawing the treatment was in 
breach of articles 2, 3 and 8 in the Convention.469 The Court found that the applicants could not 
complain on behalf of Vincent Lambert but went on to examine the substantive issues on the 
applicants’ own behalf.470   
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End of life issues are regulated in France under the so called “Leonetti Act”, which, in the Court’s 
words, does not authorize euthanasia or assisted suicide, albeit it allows withdrawal of LST under 
certain criteria.471 As with previous end-of-life cases above, the Court again held that States have 
a certain margin of appreciation regarding end of life issues.472 Regarding the decision-making 
process, as in this case there was no advance directives or a designated person of trust, the Court 
noted that it varies between States. The final decision may be taken either by the doctor, the doctor 
together with the family, the family alone or by a legal representative or courts.473  
The Court held that the decision-making process falls within the margin of appreciation of States, 
and that it was in accordance with article 2 in this case, despite the fact that the family members 
had differing views on whether or not to end the LST.474 The Court emphasized the importance of 
the patient’s own wishes, holding that even when the patient is unable to express their wishes his 
“consent must remain at heart”.475 The Court has previously in the Pretty case stated that 
individuals have the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment and held therefore in the Lambert 
case that Conseil d’État was authorized to take into consideration the wishes he had shared with 
his wife and brother.476 The State had fulfilled its positive obligations under article 2 and there was 
no violation of the article.477 
The judgement in the Lambert case was not a unanimous decision, as there were disagreements on 
several points in the case. Five partly dissenting judges in the case emphasized that articles 2 and 
3 do not contain a negative aspect in that one does not have a right to die under article 2, nor does 
one have a right to be subjected to ill-treatment under article 3, for example by being “beaten, 
tortured or starved to death”.478 They were not convinced that Vincent Lambert had clearly 
expressed a wish not to be kept alive in a situation such as where he in this case found himself to 
be, as he had not written advance directives or designated a person of trust. They stated that “[e]ven 
if, for the sake of argument, Vincent Lambert had indeed expressed the view that he would have 
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refused to be kept in a state of great dependency, such a statement does not in our view offer a 
sufficient degree of certainty regarding his desire to be deprived of food and water.”479 They also 
did not agree that Vincent Lambert was in an end-of-life situation.480 
The partly dissenting judges held that there was no question about whether Vincent Lambert was 
alive, as he was not braindead and was able to breathe on his own as well as digest food, albeit he 
was, at best, in a minimally conscious state.481 The partly dissenting judges seem to have chosen a 
definition of death which includes the cessation of all activity of the brain.482  They held that the 
State has an obligation under article 2 to keep providing Vincent Lambert with food and 
water.483 As Arend Hendriks notes, when it comes to passive euthanasia, the Court “emphasises 
the importance of a good and foreseeable decision-making process where all arguments expressed 
are taken into account”.484 
4.2. Passive euthanasia in cases of minor patients 
Unlike active euthanasia and assisted suicide, passive euthanasia cases regarding minor patients 
have been brought to the ECtHR. In Glass v. the United Kingdom, 485 the mother of a minor patient 
complained about the administering of diamorphine to her son against her will, as well as the 
placing of a do-not-resuscitate order by a doctor without her consent.486 The applicants in the case 
were the mother and her son David, who was severely disabled, both mentally and physically.487 
On one occasion, when David’s condition had worsened, he was admitted to a hospital, where 
doctors suggested the administering of morphine in order to ease David’s distress. David’s mother 
opposed it. David’s doctor furthermore believed that if David’s state was to worsen to the point of 
his heart stopping, David should not be resuscitated, as he thought that would be against the child’s 
best interests.488 
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The decision to administer diamorphine to the applicant was finally taken, against the mother’s 
will, as David’s medical team believed he was dying and in need of pain relief. 489 The applicants 
claimed that the dose of diamorphine that was given was suitable for adults, not for a child.490 A 
do-not-resuscitate order was also placed.491 The belief of the medical team that David was dying 
turned out to be false, as David’s condition improved and he was eventually released from the 
hospital.492 
The applicants complained in front of the ECtHR that their rights under article 8, in David’s case 
the right to physical and moral integrity, had been violated. They claimed that the actions taken by 
the doctors were illegal, as they administered the drug against the mother’s will without a court 
decision being involved.493 The applicants claimed that in the doctors’ conduct they failed to 
efficiently respect the interests of both applicants.494 The government held that in exceptional 
situations of emergency the consent of a parent was not required.495 Furthermore, the government 
noted that the doctors were forced to make quick decisions as the patient was in a critical situation. 
They had to act in the best interests of the child.496 
The Court decided to examine the case form David’s viewpoint, despite the mother also claiming 
to have been a victim of a violation of article 8.497 The Court noted that the mother was David’s 
legal proxy and had therefore the authority to act on behalf of David and to defend his best interests 
in medical decisions. The Court noted that the mother’s objections to the administration of 
diamorphine was overridden, which it considered to be an interference with David’s right to 
physical integrity.498 The Court held that the actions taken by the doctors were not unlawful and 
that it was clear that the doctors did not try to hasten David’s death, but rather to act in David’s 
best interests.499  
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When assessing the necessity of the doctors actions, the Court held that the hospital could have 
sought intervention by the High Court before an emergency arose, as the doctors were aware, that 
she was reluctant to agree with the advice doctors had in case of an emergency.500 It also noted 
that a consent to the administering of morphine was given by the mother in a previous discussion, 
but that it was clear that she had later withdrawn that consent, which the doctors failed to respect.501 
The Court held that there had been a violation of article 8, as the hospital and the doctors had 
overridden the mother’s objection to the treatment.502 
A breach does not automatically occur when medical staff act in contrast to what the parents of a 
minor wish. Gard and others v. the United Kingdom503 is an inadmissibility decision concerning 
the withdrawal of LST of a minor. Charlie Gad was a baby who suffered from a severe 
mitochondrial disease, which caused him to be dependent of a ventilator for breathing. He suffered 
from several health issues, including severe epilepsy disorder, absence of signs of normal brain 
activity and the inability to move his limbs. He was also deaf.504 Charlie’s parents wanted to try a 
treatment called nucleoside treatment, which had only been used on patients with less severe 
mitochondrial condition. The American doctor providing this treatment stated that there was a 
theoretical possibility that the treatment might benefit Charlie,505 but after Charlie suffered from 
brain seizures due to his epilepsy, the treating clinicians held that the treatment would be futile.506 
The hospital where Charlie was applied to the High Court to withdraw the artificial ventilation of 
Charlie, as they deemed it to be in his best interests. Charlie’s parents opposed the withdrawing of 
his artificial ventilation.507 The domestic courts deemed it to be in the best interest of Charlie to 
withdraw his treatment so that his suffering would not continue, rather than taking him to America 
for the experimental treatment.508 The parents took the matter to the ECtHR. When the Court 
addressed the issue regarding article 2, it listed three things to consider in cases of withdrawal of 
LST based on the Lambert case;  
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- the existence in domestic law and practice of a regulatory framework compatible with the requirements of 
Article 2; 
- whether account had been taken of the applicant’s previously expressed wishes and those of the persons close 
to him, as well as the opinions of other medical personnel; 
- the possibility to approach the courts in the event of doubts as to the best decision to take in the patient’s 
interests509 
What makes this case different from the Lambert case, is that the patient was a baby, thus did not 
have any previous wishes. However, an independent guardian was assigned to Charlie by the High 
Court to protect the patient’s best interests,510 which the Court interpreted as a way to ensure 
Charlie’s wishes were expressed.511 The guardian was of the opinion that taking Charlie to the 
USA for the experimental treatment was not in his best interests.512 Opinions of medical personnel 
were thoroughly examined; the Court was satisfied with the conduct of the domestic courts and 
the views of Charlie’s parents were considered. The Court held for these reasons that the second 
element of the list from the Lambert case was satisfied.513 It also found the first and third element 
to be fulfilled,514 and noted the margin of appreciation that States enjoy in such issues, therefore 
concluding that the applicants’ claims under article 2 being manifestly ill-founded.515 
When it came to article 8, the Court reminded it has in previous case law held that treating a child 
against the wishes of their parents was in violation of the child’s rights under the article.516 The 
Court also reminded that it has previously considered appropriate in case of a conflict between the 
wishes of the parents and the opinion of the medical personnel to refer the matter to a domestic 
court. 517 It also emphasized on the broad consensus regarding the treatment of children, namely 
that the child’s best interest is of primary importance.518 The Court held that there had been an 
interference of the rights of the parents under article 8.519 It found however that the interference 
was in accordance with the law, that it had the legitimate aim of protecting “integrity and moral” 
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and “rights and freedoms” of the child and that the decisions taken were not arbitrary or 
disproportionate. 520 The application was declared inadmissible.521 
A similar situation was presented in the inadmissibility decision Afiri and Biddarri v. France,522 
which concerned the complaint of the withdrawal of LST of the applicants’ 14-year-old daughter 
who was in a persistent vegetative state due to an acute cardio-respiratory failure.523 The medical 
practitioners suggested the withdrawing of the LST, which the parents did not agree with.524 The 
doctors tried to explain the situation of their daughter to the applicants and held it was not in the 
best interest of her to continue the treatment like her parents wished, but the parents refused to 
agree to the withdrawal of the treatment.525 The applicants based their complaints before the Court 
on articles 2 and 8, claiming that their rights under these articles were violated because a decision 
was made to withdraw the treatment of their daughter based on the doctors’ assessments despite 
the fact that they opposed to it.526 
Once again the Court emphasized the margin of appreciation which is left to the States when it 
comes to end-of-life situations, both with regard to the balancing of right to life and the right to 
private life when it comes to patients, as well as whether or not to allow cessation of LST. It also 
reminded that this margin of appreciation is not without limits.527 The applicants in the case 
claimed that the domestic law was not clear enough on situations where parents oppose to 
withdrawing a LST  from a minor child.528 However, the Court noted that it had already considered 
in the Lambert case that the law was sufficiently clear. The law had been modified but not to a 
significant extent. Furthermore, the applicants did not complain about the modifications to the 
law.529 Doctors are obliged under the domestic law to try to seek the consent of the parents when 
withdrawing LST and to make the best interests of the child a priority.530 The Court held that the 
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process how the domestic law requires doctors to manage situations where the parents disagree 
complied with article 2 in the Convention.531 
The applicants complained about the fact that parents did not share the decision-making power 
with the medical professionals under the domestic law when it came to minor children.532 The 
Court however held that article 2 does not impose any specific procedure to be taken to reach a 
decision on whether to withdraw LST.533 The Court also noted that the procedure required by the 
domestic law was followed in this case, that is to say the medical professionals had consulted the 
parents of the minor patient and they tried to come to an agreement with them.  
The Conseil d’État had found the information on the patient’s wishes to be contradictory, which 
is why it could not be determined with certainty. It had also emphasized the importance of the 
opinion of the parents in cases where the wishes of the patient as unknown but noted that the 
parents had indeed been involved in the decision-making process.534 The Court concluded what it 
had already stated in the Lambert case, namely that the decision-making process in the area falls 
within the margin of appreciation of States.535 The Court held that even if the parents do not agree 
with the decision taken regarding the withdrawing of their daughter’s treatment, the procedure 
applied in the case was enough for article 2 not have been breached.536 The Court also found that 
the national authorities had complied with requirements under article 2 and therefore declared the 
complaints to be manifestly ill-founded.537 
Based on these cases, it seems that the best interests of the child take priority in situations of 
treatment withdrawal of minor patients. However, the wishes of the parents are not completely 
irrelevant either, as was shown in the Glass case. Similarly to the Lambert case, the Court did not 
emphasize the need to protect the vulnerable as it has done in assisted suicide cases.  
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4.2. Refusing life-sustaining treatment  
4.2.1. Refusing life-sustaining treatment based on personal autonomy 
The right to decide how and when to die originated in the Pretty case,538 and was further described 
in the Haas case.539 Black argues that despite these cases addressing assisted suicide, the 
applicability of article 8 reaches beyond it and may apply in multiple different end-of-life 
scenarios, including the right to refuse LST.540 Black notes that the right to decide how and when 
to die is “somewhat loose”, as interference is permissible in some situations with accordance to 
the second paragraph of article 8.541 Black therefore argues that it is a prima facie right and 
therefore suggests that it is preferable to call it a freedom rather than a right.542  
As Black specifies, because the freedom to refuse LST is connected to personal autonomy, it 
follows that there are situations where such a refusal is not an expression of that freedom. 
Therefore, article 8 does not apply to non-autonomous refusals to LST.543 In the Pretty case the 
Court stated that 
In the sphere of medical treatment, the refusal to accept a particular treatment might, inevitably, lead to a fatal 
outcome, yet the imposition of medical treatment, without the consent of a mentally competent adult patient, 
would interfere with a person's physical integrity in a manner capable of engaging the rights protected under 
Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. As recognised in domestic case-law, a person may claim to exercise a choice 
to die by declining to consent to treatment which might have the effect of prolonging his life544 
Tiensuu interprets the right to refuse LST as a right to be allowed to die. As he notes, however, the 
House of Lords Selected Committee held that “[t]he right to refuse medical treatment is far 
removed from the right to request assistance in dying”.545 Tiensuu interprets the Courts judgement 
in the Pretty case as agreeing with this statement. He notes however that this is not a self-evident 
conclusion, as the opposite interpretation has been taken by the Netherlands, which he argues 
based its legalization of assisted suicide on the same principles as the right to refuse LST is based 
on.546 Tiensuu argues that if palliative care and the right to refuse LST is accepted, then an absolute 
prohibition on assisted suicide becomes problematic.547 
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The criteria that the Court mentioned in the Pretty case for the consent to be legitimate is that the 
patient is an adult who is mentally competent. Black argues that these requirements expressed by 
the Court do not encompass all situations where a patient might make a non-autonomous decision 
to refuse medication. She argues that situations including coercion and undue influence can also 
lead to a non-autonomous refusal of medication.  She goes on to argue that a wider view of a 
legitimate consent may be found in the Haas case.548 Black bases her suggestion on paragraph 51 
in the case, citing the Court as saying  
the Court considers that the right of an individual to decide how and when to end his life, provided that said 
individual is in a position to make up his own mind in that respect […] is one aspect of the right to respect for 
private life within the meaning of art.8 of the Convention549 
Paragraph 51 in Haas, however, states that 
 […]the Court considers that an individual’s right to decide by what means and at what point his or her life will 
end, provided he or she is capable of freely reaching a decision on this question and acting in consequence, is 
one of the aspects of the right to respect for private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.550  
Nevertheless, the Court phrases the requirement of a legitimate consent in a different manner 
compared to the Pretty case, perhaps encompassing the broader view Black is suggesting. In 
Recommendation 1418 the PACE included similar requirements that Black is suggesting for a 
legitimate refusal, as it stated that States should protect the self-determination of terminally ill 
patients and taking necessary measures “to ensure that no terminally ill or dying person is treated 
against his or her will while ensuring that he or she is neither influenced nor pressured by another 
person. Furthermore, safeguards are to be envisaged to ensure that their wishes are not formed 
under economic pressure […]”551 
When it comes to the timing of the refusal to LST, i.e. whether the refusal is made in the current 
time or in advance, Black argues that it is irrelevant. She argues that if the decision is made for the 
future by a patient who still has decision-making capacity, it is a valid autonomous decision, even 
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if the patient lacks decision-making capacity when the decision takes effect. The justification for 
this argument is that both decisions are an attempt to decide how and when to die.552  
The second paragraph of article 8 opens the possibility to legitimate interferences to the freedom 
to refuse LST. Black argues that refusals to LST that pose a threat to population health, which has 
been found to be included under “the protection of health and morals” of article 8 (2),553 may be 
the only proportionate restriction of the right to choose how and when to die.554 Such a scenario 
could be for example if the patient suffers from an infectious disease and wants to refuse treatment. 
If the disease poses a threat to the health of other individuals, it may be legitimate to deny the 
patient the possibility to refuse treatment.555 In fact, Black argues that if a State were to allow a 
patient to refuse treatment in such a scenario, the State would violate its obligations by risking 
public health.556  
The issue of risking the health of a third party has even been mentioned by the ECtHR in the case 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia,557 where the Court noted that in many 
jurisdictions the only exception to the patients’ freedom of choice in health care has been when a 
refusal of treatment threatens the security of a third party, taking mandatory vaccination during an 
epidemic as an example.558 Black notes in her thesis however that there may be other ways to 
eliminate the risks to the health of others were the patient to suffer from an infectious disease, for 
example through quarantine. She estimates that the limitation to the right to choose how and when 
to die caused by threats to populations health is likely to be rather limited in scope.559 Black 
concludes that the freedom to refuse LST is extensive and argues that if a State intervenes with 
this freedom, when it is in accordance with the right to decide how and when to die, is incompatible 
with article 8.560 Dorscheidt also argues that preventing the spread of contagious diseases is the 
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only scenario where a State may interfere with the freedom of choice in health care. He argues that 
in any other case, such an interference would only diminish the value of life.561 
Black is not convinced by arguments against the authorization of refusals of LST which may at 
first glance look persuasive.562 This includes arguments such as loved ones suffering if the patient 
refuses treatment and the argument that such refusals should be prohibited in order to protect the 
vulnerable. She argues that individuals having an obligation to make decisions in their lives that 
favour the interests of their loved ones over their own interests seems to be “a highly unintuitive 
characterization of the obligations that attach to close personal relationships […]”.563 Black notes 
that unlike in discussions of assisted dying, the argument regarding the protection of the vulnerable 
is seldom present in discussions of refusal of treatment. She speculates that this is perhaps because 
of procedural requirements can ensure that the decision is truly autonomous. She argues that the 
autonomy of individuals who wish to refuse treatment should not be set aside to ensure the 
protection of the vulnerable.564 
4.2.2. Refusing life-sustaining treatment on the basis of a belief 
Wicks argues that article 9 in the Convention may be relevant in refusals of LST.565 She makes 
her case by studying English law, but the analysis is included in this thesis nevertheless, as it may 
give ideas on what types of issues may arise if article 9 is used as a justification of a refusal of 
treatment. As Wicks mentions, perhaps the most well-known example of a situation where a 
patient may refuse LST due to religious beliefs is a Jehovah’s Witness refusing blood transfusion. 
This might amount to a manifestation of a belief within the meaning of article 9.566 It seems that a 
refusal to LST does not need to be based on a rational decision, as the Court stated in the Jehovah’s 
Witness case that 
The freedom to accept or refuse specific medical treatment, or to select an alternative form of treatment, is vital 
to the principles of self-determination and personal autonomy. A competent adult patient is free to decide, for 
instance, whether or not to undergo surgery or treatment or, by the same token, to have a blood transfusion. 
However, for this freedom to be meaningful, patients must have the right to make choices that accord with 
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their own views and values, regardless of how irrational, unwise or imprudent such choices may appear to 
others.567 
 
 Wicks argues that it is likely that religious beliefs will be accepted easier than secular ones even 
with regard to refusal of treatment. However, assessing whether the refusal based on a religious 
conviction truly is an autonomous one might be more problematic, especially if the patient is a 
child. As Wicks mentions, the patient may be at a risk of indoctrination or they may be pressured 
by religious family members to refuse the treatment.568 A case in England, Re E, regarded a 15-
year-old boy who refused a blood transfusion as he was a Jehovah’s Witness. The transfusion was 
however authorized, as the court held that he was not competent to make the decision.569 Whether 
or not the ECtHR would come to the same conclusion can only be speculated, as such a case has 
not been brought before the Court. Based on its case law regarding medical treatment withdrawal 
of children, however, it seems that the Court prioritizes the best interests of the child, and therefore 
one could speculate that the Court would come to the same conclusion as the English court did, 
namely that in case the medical professionals saw it as necessary for the child to receive blood 
transfusion they would be authorized to do it.  
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the extent to which individuals can choose how and when 
to die in accordance with the ECHR. In order to address the question relevant articles in the ECHR 
were presented. When examining perhaps the most obvious relevant right under the Convention, 
namely the right to life, it was demonstrated that albeit the right is considered to be one of the most 
fundamental rights under the Convention, it is not an absolute right lacking any exceptions. Case-
law of the ECtHR has demonstrated that States have both positive and negative obligations under 
article 2. It has also been established in the case-law that States can sometimes have an obligation 
to prevent individuals form committing suicide, but this has only been established in specific 
circumstances, such as when an individual is detained. Apart from inadmissibility cases, article 2 
in relation to assisted suicide has only been invoked in the Pretty case. The Court clearly 
established that there is no right to die under article 2. The Court held that the blanked ban in the 
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State did not breach the article. However, it did not state that authorizing assisted suicide would 
breach article 2 either.  
Article 2 has been invoked in passive euthanasia cases. Based on the Lambert case, in addition to 
several inadmissibility cases, it seems rather clear that States do not have an obligation to keep 
patients who are in a persistent vegetative state alive. Some factors should be considered, however. 
The previous wishes and beliefs of the individuals are to be considered when making the decision 
to withdraw treatment. The wishes of loved ones may play a role as well, especially when it comes 
to parents of a minor patient, but it is more relevant under article 8. If the patient is a young minor 
who has not had the chance to express previous wishes, it seems, based on the Gard case, that a 
system where a guardian is designated to the child can serve a similar function in the decision-
making process. The Court, as well as different governments, do not seem to consider withdrawing 
or withholding LST as a form of euthanasia. Thus, even States that do not allow assisted suicide 
or voluntary euthanasia sometimes allow passive euthanasia. The emphasis on protection of the 
vulnerable is more or less absent in passive euthanasia cases, in contrast to the heavy emphasis 
placed on it in assisted suicide cases. Nonetheless, the Court has not stated in any of the end-of-
life cases that assisted dying in any form, at least as long as there is a legitimate consent and the 
wishes of the patient are considered, would violate article 2.  
Article 3, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, was shown to be an 
absolute right with no exceptions, not even when national security is threatened. States have been 
shown to have positive obligations under the article, meaning that they must protect their citizens 
from ill-treatment. There are specific standards for when an act can be considered ill-treatment 
under the article, for example, the act must attain a minimum level of severity. It has been 
established that suffering resulting from a disease can lead to a breach of article 3, if the State act 
in a manner that causes it to worsen. However, in the Pretty case the Court held that the blanket 
ban did not breach the applicant’s rights under article 3, as it was clear that no ill-treatment had 
been inflicted on her by public authorities. Furthermore, the applicant was receiving the medical 
care that she needed. As has been argued, it seems that even when a mentally competent individuals 
invoke article 3 regarding requests to assisted suicide, States can deny it based on the right to life. 
In the absence of intentional humiliation by medical personnel inflicted on a suffering patient 
wishing to die, or alternatively appalling medical treatment imposed on such a patient, it seems 
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unlikely that any breach of article 3 would be found when States prohibit assisted dying. Therefore, 
advocating for a right to assisted dying based on article 3 does not seem promising.  
The right to private life seems to be one of the most relevant articles when it comes to assisted 
dying, as all cases assessed by the Court regarding assisted dying have involved claims under 
article 8. The article has been shown to include the right to self-determination, albeit it is not 
explicitly listed under the article. The right to autonomy is one of the most often used arguments 
for assisted dying. Rights under article 8 are nevertheless not absolute, as article 8 (2) allows for 
some exceptions. Therefore, even if a right under article 8 has been interfered with, it is still 
possible that the article has not been breached. The Pretty case was where the Court first introduced 
the notion of a right to choose how and when to die. At that point it was worded in a rather uncertain 
manner. In the Haas case, however, it became clearer that the article does indeed entail that right. 
The Haas case has been interpreted in different ways. Some interpret the case as a clear statement 
that a right to suicide or even a right to assisted suicide exists under article 8, while others are not 
convinced by that. It is difficult to determine whether such a right exists under article 8, as the 
Court uses a rather vague language when addressing the issue. It has repeatedly kept to assessing 
the procedural rights of the applicants rather than the substantive issues, including the Koch case 
where the Court found a violation of article 8.  
Controversially, the right to refuse medical treatment seems to be better established compared to 
the right to assisted suicide, despite the fact that both will have the same end result, death. 
Arguably, there may be proportionate limitations to that right as well, namely when the refusal of 
medical treatment can lead to a threat to population health. Another possible exception may be 
when a child refuses lifesaving treatment, as it may not be regarded as a legitimate autonomous 
refusal of LST. It has however not been confirmed by the ECtHR as such a case has not yet been 
brought before it. 
It is uncertain whether States are obliged under article 8 to aid a dignified death but based on case 
law some conclusions on limitations can be drawn. If a State allows for assisted dying it must 
ensure that vulnerable individuals are protected. An appropriate way seems to be, based on the 
Haas case, requiring a prescription for a lethal substance. The Court hinted of the existence of a 
positive obligation to facilitate death with dignity but did not expressly state so and it therefore 
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remains unsettled.  The Court has also emphasized the importance of decision-making capacity in 
assisted dying.   
One largely ignored article on the issue of assisted dying, that may nevertheless be relevant, is 
article 9, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It has been invoked in one assisted 
suicide case; the Pretty case, where the Court did not find a violation of the article. The article has 
been established to protect not only religious beliefs, but also secular beliefs, although arguments 
have been presented regarding the possible difficulty of invoicing the protection of secular beliefs 
under the article. A personal belief may be at a disadvantage if it is a secular one, but since the 
Eweida case, it could be argued that death with dignity can amount to a belief under article 9. 
Regardless, this does not mean that a State would necessarily breach the article even if death with 
dignity was recognized as a belief within the meaning of the article, as States may be able to justify 
a restriction based on article 9 (2). The other possibility under article 9 is that individuals may 
invoke the article by basing their argument on a conscientious objection. It may be possible for 
death with dignity to fulfil the requirements in the Eweida case. However, it has also been argued 
that conscientious obligation against military service is simply an exception and does not 
necessarily apply in other situations.  
As article 8 was shown to be engaged in the Pretty case, the Court examined the possible breach 
of article 14 in conjunction with article 8. In the Pretty case the applicant claimed that the blanket 
prohibition on assisted suicide was discriminatory as the State failed to treat people who are unable 
to commit suicide on their own differently from people who are able to do it. The Court disagreed 
with the applicant and took the view of the government, namely focusing the argument on a type 
of slippery slope argument.  
The slippery slope argument presented by the government and agreed on by the Court in the Pretty 
case has been criticized heavily and could indeed have been better constructed in the case. The 
article was addressed in a brief manner in the case and the Court failed to consider the possibilities 
for exceptions to a blanket prohibition. No argument was made either by the government nor by 
the Court on why the restrictions applied to rejection of medical treatment would not be sufficient 
to protect the vulnerable against non-voluntary assisted dying. Furthermore, arguments presented 
by Tiensuu indicate that even if assisted suicide was authorized, it would not automatically lead to 
patients opting for it rather than other alternatives such as palliative care. Patients who are at the 
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end of their lives could therefore still choose to die naturally. Nonetheless, it remains uncertain 
whether the Court would ever find a breach of article 14 regarding a blanket prohibition of assisted 
dying. 
In conclusion, article 2 does not seem to impose States any general obligations to prevent suicide, 
even when the suicide requires the involvement of a third party. At the same time, it is clear that 
the article itself does not include a right to die. The most promising article regarding an unqualified 
right to suicide is article 8, as it has already been established that it contains a right to choose how 
and when to die. Whether or not States are obliged to ensure that everyone has an equal opportunity 
to end their own life, that is to say both the disables and the able bodied, remains unclear. It is 
equally unclear if States have an obligation to facilitate assisted suicide for able-bodied 
individuals. However, when they do allow assisted dying, they must ensure the protection of the 
vulnerable. States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in end-of-life matters. Therefore, the Court 
leaves many decisions regarding assisted dying for the States to decide. Whether States can impose 
blanket prohibitions on assisted suicide remains debatable despite the Court not finding a violation 
of the Convention in the Pretty case. When it comes to passive euthanasia, where the previous 
wishes of the patient are considered, it appears unlikely that it would breach article 2.  
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Swedish summary 
Frågor gällande eutanasi och assisterat självmord debatteras intensivt inom etik och juridik. 570 
Fyra europeiska länder, Belgien, Nederländerna, Schweiz och Luxemburg, tillåter assisterat 
självmord eller aktiv eutanasi. 571 Den Europeiska domstolen för de mänskliga rättigheterna 
(härefter Europadomstolen) dömde det första fallet gällande assisterat självmord, Pretty mot 
Förenade kungariket, år 2001. 572 Diane Pretty klagade till domstolen över att hennes rättigheter 
hade blivit kränkta eftersom hennes man enligt engelska lagen möjligtvis skulle bli åtalad ifall han 
hade hjälpt sin fru att begå självmord. 573 Pretty var nästan helt förlamad p.g.a. den 
motorneuronsjukdom som hon led av och kunde därför inte begå självmord utan assistans. 574 
Domstolen hittade inget brott mot den Europeiska konventionen om mänskliga rättigheter (härefter 
konventionen) i fallet, men fallet var det första där domstolen nämnde att artikel 8, rätt till skydd 
för privat- och familjeliv, 575 möjligtvis skyddar rätten till att bestämma när och hur en person 
avslutar livet. 576 Principen fastställdes i fallet Haas mot Schweiz. 577 
Efter fallet Pretty har flera domar gällande slutet av livet givits av Europadomstolen. Denna 
avhandling behandlar frågor gällande möjligheter att bestämma när och hur en person avslutar 
livet enligt konventionen. Syftet är att besvara frågan om hur omfattande rätten är enligt den 
Europeiska konventionen om mänskliga rättigheter. För att besvara denna fråga kommer följande 
frågor också att behandlas i denna avhandling: Vilka rättigheter och intressen i konventionen är 
relevanta i assisterat självmord? Hur har Europadomstolen tolkat artiklar i konventionen gällande 
dödshjälp? Har staterna en obligation att säkerställa samma möjligheter till självmord för alla? 
Vilken roll spelar samtycke i beslutsprocessen? För att få svar på frågorna granskas i denna 
avhandling Europadomstolens tolkningar av artiklarna i konventionen, vetenskapliga texter och 
till en viss mån icke-bindande rättsliga instrument.  
 
570 Paterson, Craig. Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: A Natural Law Ethics Approach, Routledge, 2008, p. 1, 
tillgänglig: ProQuest Ebook Central, (Hämtad 12.4.2020) 
571 Pareek, KK, Narsimulu, G, Medicine Update & Progress in Medicine 2019, New Delhi, Jaypee Brothers Medical 
Publisher, 2019, p. 1336 
572 Pretty mot Förenade kungariket, nr. 2346/02, §32, ECHR 2002-III 
573 Ibid, para. 32 
574 Ibid, para. 7-9 
575 Europarådet, Europeiska konventionen om skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna 
ändrad genom protokoll nr 11, november 1950, ETS 5, artikel 8 
576 Ibid, para. 67 
577 Haas mot Schweiz, nr. 31322/07, § 7, ECHR 2011 
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I fallet Pretty konstaterade Europadomstolen klart att artikel 2, rätten till liv, 578 inte innehåller 
rätten att dö. 579 Domstolen fann ingen kränkning av artiklarna som Pretty klagade över i fallet, 
d.v.s. artiklarna 2, 3, 8, 9 och 14. 580 Domstolens beslut gällande förbudet mot diskriminering enligt 
artikel 14 581 har blivit kritiserat. Domstolen fann att ett totalförbud är berättigat för att skydda 
sårbara individer. 582 Flera argument har lagts fram gällande problem med domstolens förklaring 
om varför ett totalförbud mot dödshjälp är berättigat. Ett vanligt motargument är att missbruk av 
dödshjälp kan förhindras på andra sätt. 583  
Tio år efter fallet Pretty fastställde domstolen i fallet Haas att artikel 8 skyddar rätten att välja när 
och hur en person avslutar sitt liv. 584 I det fallet fann domstolen att kravet på recept på en dödlig 
substans inte kränkte den klagandes rättigheter enligt artikel 8, eftersom det var ett sätt att 
säkerställa skyddet av sårbara individer. 585 Det första fallet där domstolen fann ett brott mot artikel 
8 gällande assisterat självmord var fallet Koch mot Tyskland. 586 Fallet handlade om en tysk kvinna 
som var nästan helt förlamad.587 Hon ville avsluta sitt liv hemma, men var förhindrad att göra det 
p.g.a. Tysklands lag som kriminaliserade assisterat självmord. 588 Hon var tvungen att åka till 
Schweiz där hon tog livet sig själv. 589 Hennes man klagade inför Europadomstolen, som fann att 
staten hade brutit mot artikel 8 i konventionen. 590 Domstolen granskade dock inte ifall materiella 
rättigheter enligt artikeln hade brutits, utan fokuserade på granskningen av processuella rättigheter 
som artikeln skyddar. 591 Domstolen har inte nämnt i ett endaste fall att stater som tillåter dödshjälp 
skulle bryta mot artikel 2. 
 
578 Europarådet, Europeiska konventionen om skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna 
ändrad genom protokoll nr 11, november 1950, ETS 5, artikel 2 
579 Pretty mot Förenade kungariket, nr. 2346/02, §39, ECHR 2002-III 
580 Ibid, para. 42, 56, 78, 83 och 90 
581 Europarådet, Europeiska konventionen om skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna 
ändrad genom protokoll nr 11, november 1950, ETS 5, artikel 14 
582 Pretty mot Förenade kungariket, nr. 2346/02, §89, ECHR 2002-III 
583 Se till exempel 583 Pedain, Antje, The human rights dimension of the Diane Pretty case, The Cambridge Law 
Journal, 62 (1), Cambridge University Press, (2003), s. 203 och Tiensuu, Paul, ‘Whose Right to What Life: Assisted 
Suicide and the Right to Life as a Fundamental Right’, (2015), 15 (2), Human Rights Law Review, 251, s. 264 
584 Se fotnot 7 
585 Haas mot Schweiz, nr. 31322/07, § 58 och 61, ECHR 2011 
586 Koch mot Tyskland, nr. 497/09, 19 juli 2012 
587 Ibid, para. 8 
588 Ibid, para. 9-10 och 23 
589 Ibid, para. 12 
590 Ibid, para. 54 
591 Puppinck, Gregor, de la Hougue, Claire, ‘The Right to Assisted Suicide in the Case Law of the European Court 
of Human Rights’, (2014), 18 (7-8), The International Journal of Human Rights, 735, s.742 
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Artikel 2 och 8 har också åberopats i fall som handlar om passiv eutanasi. I fallet Lambert med 
flera mot Frankrike 592, som handlade om en fransk man, Vincent Lambert, som efter en bilolycka 
blev tetraplegisk, 593 fann domstolen att inget brott mot artikel 2 sker ifall det artificiella 
upprätthållandet av patientens liv skulle avslutas. 594 Domstolen betonade vikten av samtycke även 
i fall där patienten är medvetslös, och beaktade Vincent Lamberts tidigare uttryckta önskemål om 
behandlingsmetoder om han någonsin skulle vara i en situation som den han befann sig i efter 
olyckan. Domstolen ansåg att Vincent Lamberts önskemål kunde beaktas, trotts att de endast hade 
blivit uttryckta muntligt. 595 Domstolen fann inget brott mot konventionen i beslutet Gard mot 
Förenade kungariket heller, där det artificiella upprätthållandet av liv för en bebis skulle slutas 
emot föräldrarnas vilja. 596 Däremot fann domstolen att en minderårigs förälders rättigheter enligt 
artikel 8 hade kränkts i ett fall där läkarna handlade emot föräldrarnas önskan och gav 
diacetylmorfin till barnet för att de trodde att barnet skulle dö. 597 
När domstolen har granskat artikel 8 gällande assisterat självmord har den i allmänhet hållit sig till 
att granska processuella rättigheter, 598 vilket gör att det är svårt att dra exakta slutsatser av 
innehållet i rätten att välja när och hur en person avslutar livet. Vissa slutsatser kan dock dras. 
Artikel 2 innehåller inte rätten att dö, men däremot bryter stater knappast mot artikel 2 ifall de 
tillåter assisterat självmord. Vissa krav kan dock ställas på sådana stater. De måste säkerställa 
skyddet av sårbara människor. Detta kan ske till exempel genom att kräva recept på dödliga 
substanser. Ifall ett totalförbud mot dödshjälp kan berättigas är oklart fastän domstolen inte fann 
något brott mot artikel 14 i fallet Pretty.  
Passiv eutanasi verkar inte bryta mot artikel 2. Patientens samtycke är viktigt också ifall där 
patienten inte kan uttrycka sig. Detta kan ske genom tidigare uttryckta önskemål. Då det gäller 
passiv eutanasi för minderåriga patienter borde föräldrarnas vilja beaktas. Det betyder dock inte 
att läkarna alltid måste handla i enlighet med föräldrarnas åsikter, vilket var tydligt i fallet Gard. 
 
592 Lambert med flera mot Frankrike [GC], nr. 46043/14, ECHR 2015 (extracts) 
593 Ibid, para. 11 
594 Ibid, para. 182 
595 Ibid, para. 176 och 178-180 
596 Gard mot Förenade kungariket (besl.), nr. 39793/17, ECHR 2017 
597 Glass mot Förenade kungariket, nr. 61827/00, ECHR 2004-II 
598 Bernadette, Wicks, Ovey, (n 23), p. 447 
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